CABINET PAPERS:

Complete classes from the CAB & PREM series in the Public Record Office

Series Three: CAB 128 & CAB 129 - Cabinet Conclusions and Cabinet Memoranda,

1945 and following

Part 7: The Heath Government - June 1970 - March 1974

Publisher's Note

These records focus on the Heath Government, June 1970-March 1974. This microfilm series has been published as a joint venture by Adam Matthew Publications and The National Archives, Kew.

CAB 128 and CAB 129 represent the highest level of British governmental documents recording the minutes and memoranda of the weekly Cabinet meetings held by the Prime Minister and his senior Ministers.  These documents form the apex of the whole governmental and civil service structure; of the thousands of documents generated by the machinery of government and its many departments, only the most important and highly concentrated reached the Cabinet.  As a result the material in CAB 128 and CAB 129 provides an excellent, and unique, resource for scholars bringing together material that represents the core issues facing the government of the day.

The clarity and the succinct nature of the documents will be especially useful for academics studying Post-War Britain and the problems faced by successive governments. Researchers can examine a variety of questions: How well did governments deal with difficult situations? How well did the machinery of government function under pressure? How well were fundamental problems addressed? Was there a clear strategy or did indecision hamper policy making?

2001 Releases

Having won by a majority of over 40 seats at the General Election, the Tories inherited a country which appeared to be in economic strife - wage inflation, trade deficit and industrial strikes were problems that needed to be addressed. A reflection of this can be found in CAB 128/47. Numerous Cabinet Minutes relate to the Dockers' strike, disputes over the basic minimum wage, the state of emergency, situation reports, the Government’s attitude to the findings of the Court of Inquiry and the end of the strike. Immigration, unofficial strikes by coal miners, the financial problems of Rolls-Royce, the aircraft industry, the collision of HMS Ark Royal with a Soviet destroyer and Britain’s entry into the EEC are also well covered.

Although the Dockers were at the forefront of national affairs, internationally, the possibility of restoring arms to South Africa was making headlines. Obligations under the Simonstown agreement, speculation in the press, draft policy statements and attitudes of the Commonwealth countries are included in the documents here. Conflict between the Jordanian Army and the Fedayeen also gain lengthy entries, as does the United Nations General Assembly debate on the Arab-Israeli dispute.

CAB 129/150-154 include Cabinet Memoranda covering the following topics:

• the progress of Concorde and Britain’s legal position
• the situation in Northern Ireland
• the Economic Outlook (Memorandum by the Prime Minister)
• the Public Expenditure Reviews (including the Report of the Public Expenditure Survey Committee)
• the run-down of the British Army
• the state of the Agricultural Industry
• Government initiative on maintaining essential Local Authority Services
• the White Paper on the Reorganisation of Central Government
• the European Space Conference: Post-Apollo Programme
• Utility prices
• the future of the Monopolies Commission
• a Parliamentary statement on the UK contribution to the Budget of the European Communities
• the Immigration Bill

These materials give scholars a unique opportunity to reassess the events and to judge the performance of Edward Heath and his newly appointed Ministers in their first days of office.

2002 Releases

These releases provide the complete run of Minutes and Memoranda for January-December 1971, the first full year of the Heath Administration.

Particular topics of interest are:

• Britain and Europe
• The Economy
• International Relations
• the Commonwealth
• Negotiations regarding Rhodesia
• Immigration
• Industrial Relations
• Northern Ireland
• Concorde
• Sport and Popular Culture
• Visit of Emperor Hirohito of Japan to Britain and Europe

These papers allow scholars and researchers to assess how well the Conservative Government under Edward Heath faced up to the challenges of the early 1970s. Britain was still adjusting to the new world order, divorcing itself from Empire and re-aligning itself within Europe. In economic terms the international situation was not good and the outlook was not promising. Industrial unrest in Britain continued as the Trade Unions sought to undermine the government’s attempts to control inflation by wage restraint. In Northern Ireland the situation was deteriorating rapidly.

Edward Heath’s newly elected government made membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), or Common Market as it was then known, a central plank of its policy. Negotiations had started soon after the election victory in 1970. In the middle of May, Heath made an official visit to Paris. The discussions went well and the Prime Minister reported the details to the Cabinet on his return on May 24 (see CAB 128/49 CM (71) 27). The negotiations were completed in Luxembourg the following month and by June 1971 an agreement had been reached on the terms for admission. The White Paper on British membership went through many drafts. The records reveal that each draft received careful scrutiny in Cabinet. Ministers were particularly concerned about the importance of presentation and public opinion. What were the main reasons for joining the EEC? How were the various arguments played out in Cabinet discussion? The documents provide lots of material for the researcher. In the minutes for July 1 Cabinet considers the latest draft and concludes that it “went too far in suggesting that we should never face a choice involving in some sense a sacrifice of national sovereignty.”  This was a debate set to continue for another thirty years, often a highly sensitive issue, frequently postponed, and still unresolved in Britain today. At the end of October 1971, the House of Commons voted by a large majority to approve the decision to join, although disagreements within both the Conservative and Labour parties meant that voting was not on strict party lines. Britain was to become a full member of the EEC in 1973.

Many of Britain’s trading partners in the Commonwealth, in particular Australia and New Zealand, felt betrayed by the shift towards closer economic links with Europe and sought assurances over the future of their exports. On the other hand, Britain's policy of continuing to sell arms to South Africa, despite a United Nations arms embargo, brought a severe rebuke from the other members at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in Singapore. In the event, the South African government placed no significant arms orders. While away at the conference, Milton Obote, President of Uganda, was overthrown by a military coup led by General Idi Amin. General Amin was to become one of the most notorious of Africa's dictators, but initially he was on good terms with the British government and visited London later in the year. Elsewhere in Africa, extensive negotiations with Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) eventually led to proposals for a settlement following its unilateral declaration of independence. The Cabinet Memorandum by Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, shows that the British wanted to reach a settlement that would foster racial harmony through majority rule (see CAB 129/155 CP (71) 2). The five main issues which the British government felt needed to be resolved to reach a satisfactory settlement are set out in a Memorandum presented to Cabinet (see CAB 129/159 CP (71) 127). This document makes much of the difficulties over land questions which still haunt modern Zimbabwe in 2002. The election of a new government in Malta under Prime Minister Dom Mintoff led to protracted disagreements over the cost of the defence facilities on the island.

Immigration became a major issue in 1971 with concern over the growing numbers of immigrants from the Commonwealth. The Immigration Bill was published to rationalise legislation on the subject, but no distinction was made between Commonwealth entrants and other aliens. Enoch Powell warned of an "explosion" unless there was massive repatriation. Many entrants were refugees from South Asia, whose plight was a result of the civil war and famine in East Pakistan. A declaration of independence by Bangladesh led to a vicious backlash by troops from West Pakistan and the consequential influx of two million refugees across the border into India.

American involvement in the Vietnam conflict entered its thirteenth year, with President Nixon seeking to reduce troop commitments while increasing the use of air power. Nixon's announcement of his plans to visit China presaged the end of its international isolation and its admission into the United Nations. Relations between Britain and the third super power, the Soviet Union, took a downturn with the expulsion of 105 Russian diplomats alleged to have been spies. Heath tried to build a good dialogue with President Nixon hoping for “a constant exchange of ideas, impressions, suggestions without any inhibition on either side.” The ‘special relationship’ was important to Britain. The 1971 files show that they certainly kept in touch, but perhaps relations were not as strong as Heath might have liked. Although not as prevalent as previous years, terrorism continued to plague the world's airlines and a series of assassinations and abductions were carried out against diplomats. At home, the Post Office Tower was bombed and a group calling itself the Angry Brigade claimed responsibility for bombing the home of a Cabinet minister.

In Northern Ireland events took a definite turn for the worse. What had initially been considered a simple policing operation by the Army was becoming a sectarian war which required a massive increase in the presence of British forces. The Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, James Chichester-Clark resigned and Brian Faulkner took his place. The IRA split and a more violent faction called the Provisionals was formed. The introduction of internment of suspected terrorists without trial provoked an escalation in the violence and several thousands of families, both Catholic and Protestant, were burned out of their homes. By the end of the year, the violence had claimed 173 lives, produced more than a 1000 bombings and nearly 500 armed robberies.

Edward Heath encountered serious difficulties in 1971 in terms of his economic policies and the handling of the industrial relations crisis. Britain's reputation for high quality manufacture took a knock with the financial collapse of Rolls Royce, undermined by its problems in developing aero-engines for the Lockheed Tristar. Strikes in both the public and private sector continued to disrupt life: the first ever strike by postal and telephone workers lasted for nearly 7 weeks. The government's attempt to hold back inflationary wage claims led to a two month dispute with Ford car workers but later in the year, after review of the civil list, a controversial decision was taken to double the Queen's annual allowance to £980,000. A new record figure for unemployment was set this year when it topped 800,000.

One of the biggest crises to face the Heath Government was the fate of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. The Cabinet Minutes and Memoranda show how the government was involved in the minutiae of pay negotiations, strikes and management. The shipbuilding industry was in difficulties and in 1968 four yards (Clydebank, Yarrow, Scotstoun and Govan) had merged to form a large consortium called the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. By 1971 this new consortium was on the verge of collapse and it appealed to the government to cover a deficit of £28 million.

While the Cabinet paused for thought, the media took up the story and pressed the Cabinet to make a decision about whether or not to bail out the shipbuilders. The government was torn between its policies of reducing unemployment or cutting back public spending. On 14 June the Cabinet decided that UCS had “now become a symbol of ailing enterprise, bedevilled by bad labour relations and poor management, in whose future prospects there could be little confidence.” The Cabinet agreed that UCS did not deserve to be saved (see CAB 128/49 CM (71) 31).

An advisory group was set up under Lord Robens to see whether anything could be salvaged when the consortium went into liquidation. But UCS was not going to fold away quietly. The very next day, the shop stewards were outspoken in their demands that the government should intervene to save their jobs, and determined to see the Prime Minister himself. Heath expressed a willingness to meet them despite the advice from the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry that responding to such demands would be inadvisable and most unusual. Heath met with the shop stewards on June 16 and repeated the government’s refusal to intervene to save the yards. Five days later, he invited a deputation from the Scottish Trade Union Congress to Downing Street. Heath again made it clear that the government policy was not to support 'lame duck' industries and argued: “it is not a basis in which the country can be run to pour money into debt-making companies. There is no future except in companies which can build ships and sell them at a profit. UCS has not been a success and there is no point in endeavouring to keep it alive.” The advisory group under Lord Robens confirmed this conclusion. It reported the loss of £20 million in public money on UCS and declared that an end should be made to UCS in a way that establishes beyond doubt its failure. John Davies, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, made a statement to the House of Commons on 29 July confirming liquidation.

The workers at Upper Clyde responded with a 'work in' led by shop steward Jimmy Reid. Instead of striking they took over the yards and continued to work. This won them considerable popular support and sympathy. An emergency debate was called, but Heath was away sailing his boat 'Morning Cloud' for the first race of Cowes Week. His principal private secretary, Robert Armstrong, was convinced he should come home - and desperately tried to contact him to tell him to return. Armstrong was worried about public opinion: “a mainstay of criticism is the government's heartlessness… the emotional argument for UCS is much more popular than the clinical economic analysis.”

At the heart of the crisis about the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders was a debate within the Conservative Party about which way Conservative philosophy should develop on key issues of economic policy and industrial relations. This comes through in a number of the documents reproduced here:

• a Cabinet Memorandum (see CAB 129/158 CP (71) 99), written by the Central Policy Review Staff on 30 September, weighing up the various options
• further Cabinet discussions in October (see CAB 128/49 CM (71) 50) which show the Government position becoming more flexible with the prospect of saving two or even three of the yards
• A Memorandum from the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, John Davies, to Cabinet on the November (see CAB 129/159 CP (71) 126) which outlines the change of heart

Ultimately Heath's Government decided that the social consequences of the 'lame duck' policy were too severe. Avoiding further unemployment was deemed paramount.  This was the famous 'U-turn' that Margaret Thatcher referred to in her party conference speech of 1980, when she said that "this lady's not for turning". On 24 February 1972 the Cabinet was informed that £35 million would be provided to save three of the four yards. Is it fair to portray this as a complete turn around or were the arguments always more complex? Was it a mistake that would handicap the administration for the rest of its period in office? How, why, and at what cost did the government proceed down this route? The documents covered here provide a wealth of evidence on this subject. They also set the stage for the miners’ strike and industrial disputes from 1972 onwards.

Serious debates about Concorde, the supersonic symbol of European co-operation and development continued in 1971. In Cabinet on March 18, Vernon Corfield, the Minister of Aviation and Supply, was confident about Concorde’s technological performance in current tests, but was clear that “there remains no case for proceeding with Concorde on purely economic grounds… the continuation of the project will on the most favourable assumptions result in substantial losses.” The accompanying Cabinet Memorandum (see CAB 129/156 CP (71) 31) sets outs the consequences of cancellation, in particular for Britain’s relationship with France. The Government Think Tank—the Central Policy Review Staff– assessed all the issues surrounding the project in a Cabinet Memorandum dated 29 November 1971 (see CAB 129/160  CP (71) 140).  This document begins: “Concorde is a commercial disaster. It should never have been started…”, but six pages later, the concluding recommendation is that “… The Government should commit itself whole-heartedly and publicly to Concorde.”  The Cabinet considered the CPRS review when they met on 2 December 1971. They still hoped that the French might decide to withdraw from the project, but at the same time recognised that “it is no longer realistic for us to contemplate unilateral withdrawal.”  By the end of 1971, despite powerful opposition from a number of ministers and their advisors, Britain was fully committed to Concorde, irrespective of the economic arguments.

The early 1970s also saw many changes in social, technological and cultural terms. The fashion scene saw the advent of flares, platform shoes, the mini skirt and hot pants (although the latter were banned from the Royal Enclosure at Ascot). Many people were fascinated by the Apollo 14 and 15 moon landings, Christian Barnard carried out the world’s first heart and lung transplant, and there was the first visit to Britain by Emperor Hirohito of Japan. The Jackson Five were much in evidence in 1971 and Hot Love by T. Rex topped the charts for six weeks. Many of the changes impacting society in this period can be picked up in the Cabinet Minutes and Memoranda.

Britain adopted decimal currency on 15 February 1971 and the documents reflect fears about possible public rejection of this change. Would the new system fuel inflation? Would bus crews refuse to handle the new coinage? Would Ford car workers strike over alterations to drinks vending machine prices? In the end the transition went relatively smoothly.

Set up by Heath in 1971, the main role of the Central Policy Review Staff (or ‘Think Tank’) was to provide frank advice to Cabinet on a number of specific issues (UCS and Concorde are mentioned above). It was headed by Lord Rothschild whose character strongly infuses the various CPRS documents included as memoranda in this project. Heath also asked the CPRS to provide a more general review of strategy, looking at all areas of government policy, and this was compiled at the end of September 1971, (see CAB 129/158 CP (71) 99). The document provides a fascinating overview of the year, and contains some interesting suggestions, such as the implied ’third way’ for conservatism in point 11 and some scathing assessments relating to policy on Northern Ireland in point 19.

2003 Releases

Providing the complete run of Minutes and Memoranda for January-December 1972, here there is significant material on the following topics, continuing on from major issues arising in the previous eighteen months:

• Britain and Europe
• the Economy
• the Reorganisation of the National Health Service
• the Commonwealth
• Negotiations regarding Rhodesia
• Immigration
• Industrial Relations
• Strikes and Industrial Unrest
• Northern Ireland
• the Coal and Steel Industries
• Prescription Charges
• Education
• Uganda
• Vietnam
• Icelandic Fisheries Dispute

In economic terms the international situation still did not look promising. Industrial unrest in Britain intensified as the Trade Unions sought to undermine the government’s attempts to control inflation by wage restraint. The Miners’ strike led to power cuts and a State of Emergency in February 1972. Further disruption followed when British Rail workers took industrial action. The rejection of the Jones-Aldington proposals for modernisation of the docks led to the national dock strike in July. In Northern Ireland the situation reached crisis point. Bloody Sunday was followed by the establishment of Direct Rule in March 1972.

Membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) was a central policy commitment for Edward Heath. Negotiations had started soon after the election victory in 1970. Throughout 1972 Cabinet carefully watched progress of the European Communities Bill. Discussions on key issues such as National Sovereignty, Economic and Monetary Union, and the Common Agricultural Policy continued to require attention. This was a debate set to dominate politics for another thirty years and more, with highly sensitive matters, frequently postponed, and still unresolved  in Britain today. By the close of 1972, the necessary legislation had been progressed and Britain was set to become a full member of the EEC in January 1973.

It proved a difficult year for the Chancellor of the Exchequer exacerbated by industrial disputes. In June the Government decided to float the pound. A working party was set up to explore the vexed question of Unemployment Statistics. Heath determined upon a tripartite policy of economic management involving the Government, the TUC and the CBI. A series of meetings with the TUC and the CBI were held to discuss the Government’s economic objectives: faster growth in national output and real incomes, an improvement in the relative position of the low paid, and moderation in the rate of cost and price inflation. The Prime Minister held a Press Conference talking up these initiatives on 26 September (see CAB 129/164 CP (72) 99: Tripartite Meetings with the CBI and TUC: The Government’s Proposals. Memorandum by the Prime Minister).

By the end of October it became clear that no agreement was going to be reached with the TUC and the CBI. In view of the deadlock, on 30 October, Cabinet discussed what measures to adopt. The Prime Minister announced in a statement to the House of Commons on 6 November that the Government had concluded that it was necessary, in the absence of agreement, to bring in statutory measures and that, because the main legislation would take time, there would be a standstill for an interim period of 90 days on increases in prices, rents, dividends and pay with immediate effect. This freeze on prices and pay came on top of a period of price and wage restraint. Cabinet discussions can be seen in detail in CAB 128/50 CM (72) 47 and 49. Cabinet Memoranda CAB 129/165 CP (72) 115, 116 and 117 cover the Inflation (Temporary Provisions) Bill.

The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry embarked on a Reorganisation of the Nuclear Industry and the Secretary of State for Social Services produced plans to reform the administration of the National Health Service (see CAB 129/164 CP (72) 79).

Ceylon became a republic and changed its name to Sri Lanka. Bangladesh was established as a sovereign state. These developments, problems in Uganda, and ongoing difficulties in Rhodesia involved further discussion with Commonwealth countries. Cabinet focussed on the Rhodesian situation on 22 May (see CAB 128/50 CM (72) 27). The Pearce Commission concluded that the Rhodesian people were not generally in favour of the proposed settlement plan (see CAB 129/163 CP (72) 55 for report of its findings). Sanctions continued.

Immigration continued to be a major issue in 1972 with concern over a growing influx of immigrants from Commonwealth countries. The expulsion of 40,000 British Asians from Uganda by President Idi Amin in August 1972 brought further attention to this matter (see CAB 129/164 CP (72) 91 for the text of the Home Secretary’s statement on August 18):

“In the extreme situation created by the Government of Uganda, our first responsibility is to see that our passport holders receive fair treatment; to ensure, if possible, that they are able to remain in their country of residence; and that if the Government of that country will not allow them to do this, they are given adequate time and facilities to move to the country of their choice and do not have to come to the United Kingdom under duress…. The Government are proposing to establish a Board with responsibility for the resettlement of those who come to Britain. It will be necessary to ensure that the transfer of passport holders does not impose an excessive strain on community relations in this country or housing, schools and other facilities in particular areas.”

This forced a further secret review to assess the risk of a mass expulsion of United Kingdom passport holders from countries other than Uganda. The review concentrated on four African countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia) where the risk of expulsion was deemed highest, (see CAB 129/166 CP (72) 143). In November, the Government was defeated on its new immigration rules.

An immense amount of Cabinet time was taken up by Industrial Relations and the need to respond to strikes and industrial unrest. A special meeting of Cabinet on 18 February discussed the Coalminers’ strike, the large scale power cuts, disruption and deepening crisis with 1.5 million workers laid off (see CAB 128/50 CM (72) 8). The Wilberforce enquiry set out terms for settling the dispute, conceding many of the strikers’ demands, and eventually the miners went back to work. In March, in the first big test for the National Industrial Relations Court, set up under the Industrial Relations Act, the Court imposed an initial £5000 fine on the TGWU with a further fine of £50,000 for contempt. A further fine was imposed in April. The TGWU refused to acknowledge the Court. Cabinet became involved in the details of the Railwaymen’s pay negotiations in early March (see CAB 128/50 CM (72) 12). The Railway Unions took industrial action in April. The Government responded by initiating its “cooling-off” period and compulsory ballot as per the Industrial Relations Act. The ballot voted six to one in favour of industrial action and this process was not used by the Government again. Deliberations by Cabinet on the ongoing Railwaymen’s pay dispute took up the entirety of the Cabinet meeting of 17 April (see CAB 128/50 CM (72) 21). The Government continued to be involved in the fate of the Shipbuilding industry and launched detailed assessments of the Coal and Steel industries.  It also embroiled itself in pay negotiations with airline pilots, manual workers, public servants, doctors, dentists, the Armed Forces and with the Top Salaries Review Body.

Union action in the docks, ignoring orders from the National Industrial Relations Court, led to the arrest and imprisonment of the “Pentonville Five”. A national dock strike followed with the rejection of the Jones-Aldington proposals for modernisation of the docks. In August the Official Solicitor intervened to release the dockers imprisoned under the Industrial Relations Act. In September thirty-two unions were suspended by the TUC for registering under the Industrial Relations Act. The year witnessed the highest number of days lost in strikes since 1926.

To assist with the financial problems of the coal industry the Ministerial Committee on Economic Strategy approved proposals to provide recurrent grants of about £170 million a year and agreed to cancel about £475 million of the National Coal Board’s debt to the Exchequer. In preparation for legislation to this effect, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry set out a detailed review of Coal Policy in a Memorandum of 28 November 1972 (see CAB 129/166 CP (72) 135).  There was also serious concern about employment implications stemming from substantial closures and the contraction of the British Steel Corporation. The Ministerial Committee on Economic Strategy took a detailed look at the future of the British steel industry with projections through to 1980-1981.

In Northern Ireland it was the worst year of the Troubles. Nearly 500 people died and 5,000 were injured. There were almost 2,000 explosions and over 10,000 shootings. Stormont, Northern Ireland’s own Parliament and Government was suspended and Direct Rule from Westminster began in March 1972.  Internment without trial, introduced the previous year, had led to a significant escalation in violence. In July alone, almost 100 people died in Loyalist and Republican violence. Marches had been banned, but many still took place in protest.

Included in the releases for 1972 are a series of Confidential Annexes containing Cabinet Minutes on Northern Ireland, 3 February - 25 October 1972. The first of these 21 Confidential Annexes deals with Bloody Sunday. Lord Widgery judged that he would be able to form an opinion by questioning eye-witnesses, and that he could conclude the inquiry more quickly if he conducted it alone. His findings did not settle the matter and it still remains an emotive incident today. The Saville Inquiry, set up by Tony Blair on 29 January 1998, to investigate the events of Sunday 30 January 1972, still continues today (see www.bloody-Sunday-inquiry.org.uk).

Despite objections from the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Heath’s view that Direct Rule was the only possible solution, at least in the short term, prevailed. On 22 March, after long discussions in Cabinet, Faulkner was summoned by Heath to Downing Street and given the news.  Faulkner and his Cabinet resigned.

In the Cabinet Minutes for 15 June (see CAB 128/48 CM (72) 30th Conclusions, Minute 4) the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, William Whitelaw, “proposed to take this opportunity to make it clear that he had no intention of going behind the backs of the elected representatives of the minority community in order to enter into direct negotiations with the IRA”. Yet only a week later, British officials were meeting with Gerry Adams and David O’Connell, described in the file PREM 15/1009 as “representatives of the IRA”. The record of this top secret meeting states that “there is no doubt whatever that these two at least genuinely want a cease fire and a permanent end to violence. Their appearance and manner were respectable and respectful. Their behaviour and attitude appeared to bear no relation to the indiscriminate campaigns of bombing and shooting in which they have both been prominent leaders”.  Terms for a meeting with William Whitelaw, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, were agreed, and the IRA announced a ceasefire. Two weeks later members of the IRA were flown secretly to London to enter into discussions. The talks did not go well. These developments were so secret that even the Cabinet was kept totally in the dark.

The ceasefire broke down and the secret talks came to nothing. The British Government needed to take action and it decided upon a tough line, military approach to the problems. In the meantime, Whitelaw wanted to try to restart a political dialogue with the various parties in Northern Ireland.

The Parker Report (see CAB 129/161 CP (72) 25) examined the treatment of prisoners and police brutality in Northern Ireland. The issues discussed were extremely sensitive.

A 54 page “Paper for Discussion” on the future of Northern Ireland, dated 13 October 1972, was prepared by William Whitelaw as a basis for a Green Paper (see CAB 129/165 CP (72) 108). He told his Cabinet colleagues that he had been in extensive consultations with leaders of opinion in Northern Ireland, culminating in the Darlington Conference. To this he had invited representatives of each of the seven political parties represented in the Northern Ireland House of Commons. Only three of these parties turned up for the discussions, but Whitelaw maintained that it had been nonetheless a helpful basis for exploring their views.  In his foreword to the “Paper for Discussion” he stated that “The British Government have a clear objective in Northern Ireland. It is to deliver its people from the violence and fear in which they live today and to set them free to realise their great potential to the full. We want to help them to draw together; to find a system of government which will enjoy the support and the respect of the overwhelming majority. If it is to do so, such a system must emerge in large measure from the ideas and the convictions of the Northern Ireland people themselves. This is why there has to be a lengthy process of consultation, which I started on arrival, have been continuing ever since, most recently at the Darlington conference for Northern Ireland parties, and which I shall now seek to bring to fruition over the coming weeks.”

The material released in 1972 does give the researcher a bit more detail on how the Government handled the situation in Northern Ireland. However, much information was kept secret and does not appear in the Cabinet documents. The records in the Prime Minister’s files PREM 15 (unfortunately not covered in this project) provide a slightly better insight into the secret negotiations and policy considerations.

Other issues considered by Cabinet include prescription charges, the tax-credit system, the televising of Parliament and the European Space Programme. The Icelandic Fisheries Dispute also dragged on for much of the year. The Vietnam peace talks continued in Paris. In November Henry Kissinger made his “peace is at hand” statement and by the end of the year fewer than 24,000 American troops remained in Vietnam.

Margaret Thatcher as Secretary of State for Education and Science started to make an impact with her brief. The Government had various new proposals, particularly in primary education, which it wanted to introduce. A White Paper entitled “Education: A Framework for Advance” was discussed by Cabinet at the end of the year. This set out a ten year strategy to 1981 providing new priorities and following up on the recommendations of the James Committee on Teacher Training (see CAB 129/166 CP (72) 133). These proposals featured the following main points:

• Nursery education would be provided for up to 90% of 4 year old and 50% of 3 year old children; priority would be given to deprived areas
• A programme for improving or replacing obsolete secondary schools would supplement that already operating for obsolete primary schools
• The building programme for special schools for handicapped children would be increased
• The staffing ratio in schools would be improved to give a 10% real improvement over 1971 standards
• Teachers would be released to have the equivalent of one term’s in-service training after seven years’ service; all probationary teachers would have the equivalent of one day per week to continue their training during their first year of service
• The rate of expansion of higher education would be restrained to aim at a target of 750,000 places by 1981, of which about half would be in universities; various measures would be taken to reduce unit costs

The Central Policy Review Staff (or ‘Think Tank’) provided Cabinet with a number of significant and detailed memoranda in 1972 including a Review of Government Strategy (see CAB 129/166 CP (72) 126 of November 1972). This identified four important future issues: tripartite economic management, Britain’s position and role in the world, public expenditure, and pollution; four items of unfinished business: inflation, industrial change, Northern Ireland, and Europe; as well as four gaps needing more attention in discussions of the Ministerial Strategy Group: crimes of violence, devolution with reform of the structure of local government and the problem of the rates, Parliamentary reform, and social policy initiatives.

CAB 128/48 covers the most confidential records for the period November 1970-February 1974 is divided into five parts. The first of these is closed until 2020, the second and third parts were released in 2002 and 2003 and are included here.  Another part was released in 2005 (see below). These files comprise meetings and confidential papers which were not circulated. There is a considerable amount of material on Northern Ireland, as this was filed separately from other Cabinet Minutes from 6 February 1971 onwards. These minutes were marked for “the eyes of Senior Ministers only”.

2004 Releases

The Minutes and Memoranda for January-December 1973 contain important material on the impact of:

• massive increases in oil prices as a result of the Yom Kippur War
• fuel shortages, pay and price freezes
• the Vietnam War
• the situation in the Middle East 

These files also allow scholars and researchers to review important material on:

• Britain and Europe
• the Economy and the Programme for Controlling Inflation
• the Reorganisation of the National Health Service
• Industrial Relations
• Industrial unrest and the miners’ overtime ban
• Northern Ireland
• the Sunningdale Agreement establishing a power-sharing executive in Belfast
• Fisheries dispute with Iceland over the “Cod War” in the North Atlantic
• Education
• the Commonwealth
• International Relations

The balance of payments situation deteriorated sharply in 1973 and this was not helped by significant increases in world commodity prices. On 17 January Heath spelled out details of “Stage Two” of his counter-inflation policy. An Act of Parliament would establish two new agencies: a Price Commission and a Pay Board (see CAB 128/51: CM (73) 1, 9 January, and CM (73) 9, 22 February; for the Draft White Paper see CAB 129/167: CP (73) 1, 12 January, and CAB 129/168: CP (73) 37, 21 March. There are various memoranda by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, see especially CAB 129/168: CP(73) 23, dated 22 February, and CP (73) 24, 26 February. A note by the Chief Secretary of the Treasury dated 26 March is in CAB 129/169: CP (73) 41).

“Stage Two” came into force at the beginning of April. Until the autumn there were to be no pay increases for any group of employees exceeding £1 per week, plus 4 per cent of their current pay bill excluding overtime. The Pay Board had to be notified of all settlements involving less than 1,000 employees, and settlements for more than 1,000 employees required its prior approval. It became an offence to strike or threaten to strike to force an employer to contravene an order of the Pay Board.

These measures soon caused disquiet amongst the Trade Unions. The gas workers began a campaign of strikes and overtime bans on 14 February in support of their claim for wage increases which were in excess of “Stage Two” limits. By the following day nearly 4 million homes faced reductions in gas pressure and some 600 industrial plants were forced to close.

On 27 February, for the first time in the history of the service, about 200,000 civil servants went on strike in support of their pay claim.

February also saw the start of the foreign exchange crisis with the US dollar devalued by 10 per cent. This had dramatic consequences for sterling. The Cabinet met to discuss the Budget and international monetary policy on 5 March (see CAB 128/51: CM (73) 13). The international monetary situation continued to deteriorate and on 18 April the DTI announced a trade deficit for March of £197 million - more than two and a half times as much as the deficit for the previous two months.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Anthony Barber, sought to ease pressure on home owners by giving the building societies £15 million in return for a guarantee that they would keep mortgage rates to 9.5 per cent for the next three months instead of going up to 10 per cent. A subsidy on butter was announced as well as increases in social security in an attempt to moderate the rise in the cost of living. The Cabinet considered the economic situation and cuts in public expenditure on 14 May and 16 May (see CAB 128/52: CM (73) 27 and 28). On 21 May Barber was forced to announce cuts in public spending of £100 million for 1973 and of £500 million for 1974-1975. The Government was determined to tackle the problem of the Trade Unions and industrial unrest. However, a tough stance of these issues was increasingly difficult as the economic situation weakened and public confidence ebbed away.

The Government authorised a 5 per cent increase in rail fares on 8 June, the Bank of England’s minimum lending rate went up to 11.5 per cent, and in August the building societies raised mortgage interest rates to 10 per cent.

“Stage Three” of the Government’s programme for controlling inflation was launched in October. (See CAB 129/172: CP (73) 114 for the revised text of the statutory instruments). Price controls were similar to those under “Stage Two”. Wage increases were limited to £2.25 per week or 7 per cent with a limit of £350 a year on the amount to be received by any one individual. Threshold safeguards were incorporated in case the Retail Price Index reached 7 per cent above its level at the start of “Stage Three”. These measures coincided with rapid changes in the economic situation. The Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 led to restrictions in the supply of oil. The Arab nations cut oil supplies to the west. In November OPEC introduced a major increase in oil prices. British oil imports were cut by 15 per cent. There was panic buying by motorists and long queues at petrol garages.

Against this background the Trade Unions were set on a path a bitter resistance to “Stage Three”. This conflict was to lead to the Miner’s Strike and the fall of the Heath Government at the General Election in February 1974. These issues figured heavily in Cabinet meetings throughout 1973. On 2 October, the Secretary of State for Employment reported on problems in the motor industry, the electricity industry, the railways and with the coal miners’ pay claim (see CAB 128/53: CM (73) 43).

The firemen started a series of unofficial strikes in October. The following month the Electrical Power Engineers Association banned out of hours work, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) banned overtime, and in December, the Amalgamated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) stopped all Sunday work, overtime and rest-day working. This disrupted the delivery of coal to power stations as well as causing considerable inconvenience to rail passengers. The Government refused to settle the dispute with the miners outside the terms of “Stage Three” and were forced to bring in tougher measures to deal with the crisis. Emergency restrictions were introduced to conserve fuel. These included a 50 mph speed limit, temperature control in offices, and a three day working week from 1 January 1974 as industry had to make do with an electricity supply reduced to three specified days per week. The situation quickly worsened. The minutes and memoranda reproduced here shed much light on the Government handling of this crisis.

Britain entered the European Economic Community (EEC) on 1 January 1973. This fulfilled a central policy commitment of Edward Heath.  However, the European question continued to arouse passions between and across the political parties.

The Cabinet considered tactics to be adopted on discussions of the National Health Service Reorganisation Bill on 28 June, especially with regard to a House of Lords amendment on family planning services (see CAB 128/52: CM (73) 34). There was also much debate about private practise in the NHS (see Draft White Paper of 21 March in CAB 129/168: CP (73) 38).

Political controversy over immigration continued after the Government’s defeat on this issue in November 1972. Robert Carr, the Home Secretary, announced changes to the proposed regulations to the House of Commons on 25 January 1973. Preference was given to Commonwealth citizens with rights now extended to those with British-born grandparents.

There was a furious debate over the visit of the Portuguese Prime Minister to London in July as Labour and the Liberals pointed to the atrocities committed by Portuguese troops in Mozambique. The Government was also kept under sustained pressure in 1973 over French nuclear tests in the Pacific. Heath refused to issue any public condemnation of the French action despite protests from Australia and New Zealand. The Cabinet Minutes for 28 June (see CAB 128/52: CM (73) 34) reflect that the “Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the French Government had refused to comply with an interim injunction by the International Court of Justice restraining them from conducting a series of nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean in the near future. As a result we were coming under renewed pressure to make a formal protest to them on this issue. It should suffice, however, to maintain our public contention that they were already well aware of our views.”

The situation in Northern Ireland in 1973 seemed to be improving after several years of worsening communal violence. The RUC and the Army mounted operations that succeeded in recovering a significant haul of weapons and ammunition with hundreds of arrests. The tracking of leading paramilitaries was a vital part of the campaign. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland produced a “Framework for a Settlement for Northern Ireland” (see CAB 129/168: CP (73) 27, dated 26 February). In March, the Ulster Referendum resulted in an overwhelming majority in favour of retaining links with Britain. William Whitelaw’s White Paper proposed the formation of a Northern Ireland Assembly elected by proportional representation (for the draft version of the White Paper, dated 8 March, see CAB 129/168: CP (73) 30). Closer co-operation with Dublin over security measures led to improved border controls and the capture of a boat off the Irish coast smuggling guns for the IRA.

On 28 June elections were held for the new Northern Ireland Assembly. The results were disappointing for the Government. Of the 78 seats, the anti-White Paper Unionists had 27 as opposed to the Faulkner pro-agreement Unionists with 23 and the SDLP with 19 seats. On 2 July Whitelaw wrote to the Prime Minister: “It is encouraging that the extremists on the whole fared badly. But an uncomfortably large number of seats have been won by dissident loyalists of one kind or another.”

The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Bill, implementing the recommendations of the Diplock Committee for a system of trials for alleged terrorists in Northern Ireland rather than straightforward internment, had been approved on second reading in the House of Commons. Now the task was to bring the parties together to form an Executive. The White Paper had given this task to the assembly itself, but for a month there were meetings about meetings with little progress. Tensions were again heightened by the summer marching season. The first meeting at Stormont degenerated into a brawl and the police had to be called. On 21 July, twenty large bombs killed eleven people in Belfast and injured 120. Ten days later troops occupied the “no go” areas in Belfast and Londonderry.

To address the situation Whitelaw organised all-party talks on the future of Northern Ireland at Darlington, County Durham, on 25-27 September. The SDLP boycotted the talks as a protest against the continued existence of internment. It did submit its views however, along with the Unionists, Alliance and Northern Ireland Labour Party. Out of this process came a consultative document, dated 30 October 1973, outlining a pattern of power-sharing. To move the talks forward, Whitelaw convened a tripartite conference at Sunningdale in Berkshire involving the Northern Ireland executive-designate and both the Irish and British Governments. The Unionists were completely split. Paisley’s DUP refused to take part in the Executive and thought that it could not be formed without them. Many of Faulkner’s own party members were still against the White Paper and he only narrowly hung onto the leadership of his party. The discussions faltered, but eventually it was agreed to establish a Council of Ireland, consisting of representatives of both the North and South, with the signing of the Sunningdale Agreement on 6 December. The SDLP and the two Governments were elated. The Unionists feared reactions back home and the Army and the security forces had already been preparing for the worst case scenario. Measures were drawn up to deal with the disintegration of law and order in Northern Ireland. The prospects for the future were not good. Sectarian violence continued in Northern Ireland with renewed outbreaks of letter-bombing and other outrages in England.

Other issues considered by Cabinet include the Icelandic Fisheries Dispute, the Robens Report on Health and Safety at Work, the Channel Tunnel project, the Newspaper Industry, the situation in Rhodesia, the reorganisation of the Nuclear Design and Construction Industry, Housing policy, an annual review of Agriculture, the report on the British Steel Corporation by the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, Equal Pay and Discrimination against Women, Defence Estimates and Anglo-American relations.

2005 Releases:

For 1974, the new releases of CAB 128/53 provide the minutes of the final eleven Cabinet meetings of the Heath administration. These include discussions on the Middle East, Oil, Fuel Stocks, Arab Terrorism, Northern Ireland, Industrial Relations and the Miners' Dispute, the EEC, Grenada, Electricity Restrictions, the ASLEF dispute, Steel Production, Housing Policy and Election strategy.

There is also a full run of CAB 129/174 providing Cabinet Memoranda for January-February 1974. Subjects include the Rate Support Grant, the Coal Miners' Strike, Supplementary benefit for the Strikers' Families, the Defence Estimates for 1974, and Home ownership and house building.

Finally there are also copies of the sensitive and previously held back Confidential Annexes in CAB 128/48 relating to Northern Ireland, February-October 1972. These cover Government’s efforts to deal with the deteriorating security situation in 1972.

The material includes discussions on the military response after the bombing incidents of 21 July that year. On 27 July, the Prime Minister, summing up the Cabinet’s discussion said that: “in the situation created by the bombing incidents of Friday 21 July, a military operation should be mounted to reoccupy those areas from which either the IRA or the UDA sought to exclude the normal operation of the security forces. The areas of greatest difficulty would probably be the Bogside and Creggan districts of Londonderry, and the enclaves dominated by the IRA in Belfast; nevertheless it was important that the operation should be clearly seen to be directed against extremists of either community. The operation should be launched in the early hours of Monday 31 July; and the reinforcement of the garrison with seven major units and necessary supporting elements (including armoured bulldozers) should proceed. The operation should consist of rapid and simultaneous penetration into the several areas concerned...“

(see CM (72) 38: Conclusions, Minute 3).

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on 25 October 1972 reported that: “the recent deterioration in the security situation in Northern Ireland compelled him to advise the Cabinet to reverse their earlier decision and to announce that the local government elections would not take place on 6 December, as had been earlier envisaged. Intimidation of Roman Catholics by Protestant extremists had recently increased to an alarming extent; and many Roman Catholic candidates would be too frightened to stand at the elections. Indeed, virtually none of the political Parties now wished the elections to take place on 6 December...” A six month postponement was suggested. (see CM (72) 46: Conclusions, Minute 4).

At the beginning of 1974 there is lots of material on Edward Heath's counter-inflation policy and his confrontation with the Trade Unions on Industrial Relations issues. Stage Three of Heath's counter-inflation policy came into force at a time when the economic situation was changing rapidly. The aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 led to problems in the supply of oil, on which Britain depended for 50 per cent of her energy. The price of oil rose sharply with serious implications for Britain's worsening balance of payments situation. The National Union of Mineworkers had already condemned the Government's policy of increasing the country's dependence on oil at the expense of coal. It opposed the pit closure programme and in November 1973 had implemented a ban on overtime and weekend work in support of a pay claim in excess of Stage Three.

The rapidly deteriorating fuel situation was aggravated by an out-of-hours ban by Electricity Power Engineers, which limited the ability of the Central Electricity Generating Board to cope with shortages at various power stations. Industrial action by ASLEF further disrupted the delivery of coal to power stations. The Government had then been forced to declare a State of Emergency on 13 November 1973.

This was the background to the Cabinet meetings held at the beginning of 1974 to deal with the crisis. Heath refused to make an offer to the miners outside the terms of Stage Three. Tougher emergency measures were introduced to deal with the situation: electricity was only provided to industry three days per week, a 50 mph speed limit was introduced on all roads, heating limits for commercial premises, all offices and television broadcasting had to shut down by 10.30pm. The Chancellor of the Exchequer also introduced tighter controls on consumer credit and large cuts in expenditure in an attempt to restore confidence in the Government.

CAB 128/53 is dominated by Industrial Affairs (see CM (74) 1–8) including the Confidential Annex on the Miners’ Dispute of 17 January 1974 covering the Prime Minister’s discussions with the TUC. Heath admitted that: “the TUC had used great ingenuity in trying to persuade the Government to agree that in some circumstances the NUM might be allowed a settlement beyond the Stage 3 limits. They agreed that it would be wrong to give carte blanche to the NUM. They said they would support only a “reasonable settlement” but could not define what would be reasonable.” He reported that: ”the meeting ended without agreement and on the assumption that the TUC representatives would meet the Government again if the results of their conference on Wednesday suggested that such a meeting would be worthwhile.” Much time was also spent on the Energy situation, Oil and the Middle East, Northern Ireland and the debate on the Second Report from the Select Committee on European Community Secondary Legislation. Two Cabinet Meetings were entirely taken up by discussions on Electricity Restrictions and the Miners’ Dispute (see CM (74) 5 and 6).

CAB 129/174 includes the Memorandum by Sir Keith Joseph on Supplementary Benefit for Strikers’ Families (see CP (74) 7) dated 29 January 1974 and the Memorandum by Lord Carrington with his Response to a Coal Miners’ Strike (see CP (74) 8) dated 6 February 1974. There are also papers regarding the Election Business Committee and the Prorogation of Parliament.

These Cabinet documents provide a good insight into the way the Government sought to manage the crisis. A succession of attempts including discussions with the TUC on various formulae to resolve the Miners' Dispute failed. With the deteriorating economic situation and bitter conflict with the Trade Unions over Stage Three of Heath's counter-inflation policy culminating in an all-out Miner's Strike and a three-day week, Heath was forced to call a General Election for February 28. The results gave no party an overall majority.

The situation following the General Election was the sole topic of three Cabinet Meetings in early March (see CAB 128/53: CM (74) 9–11). We include a copy of the Confidential Annex for each of these meetings. The Liberals declined to enter into a working arrangement with the Conservatives so Harold Wilson formed a new Labour minority administration on 4 March 1974.

Details of all Parts of Series Three with full coverage of CAB 128 and CAB 129 files:

Part 1: The Attlee Government, August 1945-October 1951

Part 2: The Attlee Government, August 1945-October 1951

Part 3: The Churchill and Eden Governments, October 1951-January 1957

Part 4: The Macmillan and Home Governments, January 1957-October 1964

Part 5: The Wilson Government, October 1964-December 1968

Part 6: The Wilson Government January 1969-May 1970

2000 Annual Update covering 1969 releases

2001 Annual Update covering 1970 releases

Part 7: The Heath Government June 1970-March 1974

2001 Annual Update covering 1970 releases

2002 Annual Update covering 1971 releases

2003 Annual Update covering 1972 releases

2004 Annual Update covering 1973 releases

2005 Annual Update covering 1974 releases

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