FOREIGN OFFICE FILES FOR CHINA, 1949-1976
(Public Record Office Class FO 371 and FCO 21)

Part 4: Complete Files for 1952 (PRO Class FO 371/99229-99387)

Publisher's Note

Part 4 of Foreign Office Files for China offers complete coverage of events that took place in 1952. Continuing the record of the Communist takeover of China documented in Parts 1-3, this section of the microfilm project details the efforts of the new People's Government to consolidate its position. Key aspects of the initial years of Mao Zedong's rule are detailed, including the tension over Formosa (Taiwan), Communist Party propaganda, and social and economic reform in China. What makes these files most important to scholars, however, is the viewpoint they provide from within China.

Whereas the United States refused to recognise the Communist government early on, Britain retained diplomatic links and a presence in the emerging power. British interests and contacts in the region were strong and allowed Foreign Office personnel first hand experience of the changes taking place. Records for 1952 provide a steady stream of detailed reports and memoranda on events and attitudes within China that cannot be found in US State Department files.

Part 4 begins with the valuable Annual Review (FO 371/99229), which summarises the previous year's activities in China. The review contains Foreign Office analysis of the Chinese political situation and how this has effected British-Sino relations. As a preface to the documents that follow, the Annual Review places the 1952 files in the context of the political atmosphere of the time. Particularly useful are the comments regarding the nature of the new Communist regime, as these indicate why the Chinese issue was such a high priority at the Foreign Office, and internationally, "1951 saw a marked acceleration in the Communisation of China. With the promulgation on February 21st of Regulations for the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries, and the terror which followed, the last shadow of doubt about the Chinese Communist Party's intentions was removed. They were sure of their power and could now use it without restraint to force China into the orthodox mould." (Item FC1011/1).

Against this political backdrop, the British Foreign Office was attempting to retain some kind of diplomatic relationship with China. For the welfare of its colonial and business interests in the region, Britain had made an effort to avoid ideological confrontation with the new Communist regime. Such a stance, however, had not facilitated the continuation of relations with China, as had been hoped. The Annual Review accurately predicts the direction that British-Sino relations were to take in the year ahead, "Though Her Majesty's Government recognised the Central People's Government on 6th January 1950, the establishment of formal diplomatic relations remains as remote as ever, and all the evidence tends to show that the Central People's Government do not want to establish normal diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. The Chinese did nothing to improve Sino-British relations and Chou En-lai's speech to the Chinese People's Political Consulative Conference at the end of October showed that they had no intention of easing relations: on the contrary they were likely to make them worse." (Item FC1011/1)

As well as diplomatic difficulties with China, Britain's relationship with the United States was also under pressure in 1952. One of the most striking aspects of the 1952 files is the clear difference between British and American policy on China. Several documents contain notes of caution from the Foreign Office to their US counterparts about American military activities in the region. Likewise, American bewilderment at Britain's continued relations with China is also evident. Much of the disagreement centres on the island of Formosa (Taiwan), which became the focal point of the struggle between Communism and democracy in China.

Following the fall of the Nationalist government in 1949, the anti-Communist faction of China, under the leadership of ousted President Chiang Kai-Shek, were exiled to Formosa. There, the Kuomintang government continued to function amid international debate about its legitimacy and purpose. Whilst America continued to support the Nationalists as the official government of China, Britain had recognised Mao Zedong's Chinese People's Republic as legitimate. Therefore, the extent and nature of American aid to the Nationalist government became a sticking point in British-US relations.

An extract from the "Daily Worker" on 1 January 1952 the American stance: "The American military advisors to Chiang Kai-Shek on the Chinese island of Formosa are planning an invasion of South-West China. This has been admitted in a statement by Major General William Chase, commander of the American Military Advisory Group serving with Chiang Kai-Shek. Not only will Chiang's troops be 'greatly strengthened' in 1952, says the statement, but American officers serving with them will be prepared to serve outside Formosa. The remarks were made in a New Year statement issued by the General in Taipeh, Chiang Kai-Shek's capital, a few days after Chiang Kai-Shek had called on his troops to prepare for an invasion of China in 1952." (FO 371/99231 - Item FC1015/2)

Conversely, the British Foreign Office warns against any attempt to take a Nationalist force into Chinese territory. A more cautious approach is encouraged in the hope of avoiding confrontation with the Chinese Government. In the following extract a suggestion is even made of a possible compromise over Formosa, albeit with little hope of success: "If our ultimate objective is to achieve a modus vivendi in the Far East with the Chinese Government the absolute minimum that they would expect would be the strict confinement of the Nationalists and Nationalist influence to Formosa. They would certainly not agree to this in principle and they probably would not in practice; but they might. Equally, the Americans would certainly not give up Formosa but might conceivably agree strictly to neutralise Formosa." (FO 371/99231 - Item FC1015/3)

The negotiation of a settlement with China to end the Korean War is also discussed in the 1952 files. In June 1950 the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution enabling member states to assemble troops in order to free South Korea from a Communist invasion from the North. America provided the largest amount of military assistance and the conflict in Korea became another example of the US effort to curb Communist aggression worldwide. Britain's low profile in the Korean War is highlighted in the files as another source of tension between the Foreign Office and politicians across the Atlantic.

In a speech to the US Congress on 17 January 1952, Churchill addressed the differences in British and US policy and the tension between the two countries. He also appealed to America for greater understanding of Britain's particular attitude towards the Far East in the hope that the situation would improve in the future: "You have rightly been resolute, members of the Congress, in confronting Chinese Communist aggression. We take our stand at your side - we are grateful to the US for bearing nine-tenths, or more, of the burden in Korea, which the UN have morally assumed. I am very glad that whatever diplomatic divergences there may be from time to time about procedure you do not allow the Chinese anti-Communists on Formosa to be invaded and massacred from the mainland. We welcome your patience in the armistice negotiations and our two countries are agreed that if the truce we seek is reached only to be broken, our response will be frank, resolute and effective. What I have learnt over here convinces me that British and US policy in the Far East will be marked by increasing harmony." (Item FC 1025/3)

File FO 371/99261 contains coverage of the progress of truce talks and the role that Britain should play if they fail. However, the lack of decisive action by the British incurs the wrath of one American journalist based in the UK. Writing in the Herald Tribune, David Lawrence comments: "Discussion here with members of the Government as well as the opposition reveal clearly why there has been such a divergence of opinion between the United States and Great Britain over Far Eastern questions. There is a total unawareness here of the motivating influences which have caused the American people to feel so deeply about the sacrifices made by American troops in Korea. To the British reader, Korea is just an incident. It is even less than a 'police action' in the sense that other troubles in the world are considered to be far more concerning. The British are more concerned over what has happened in Malaya and over the danger spots in Iran, Egypt and North Africa." (Item FC1027/8 - 17 May 1952)

British concern for its Far East colonial interests is a prevalent theme of the 1952 files. With Hong Kong leased by China to the British until 1997, the island became the site of ideological conflict in the dawn of the Communist era. Files FO 371/99243-246 provide detailed accounts of political activity in Hong Kong by both Communist and Nationalist supporters. Reports are received of Hong Kong inhabitants being kidnapped at gunpoint and taken back to Chinese territory. The volatility of the situation eventually caused the Foreign Office to grant the Hong Kong police permission to return fire should China endanger the safety of its residents (FO 371/99275).

Even in light of the tension over Hong Kong, the Foreign Office remained determined to establish some form of diplomatic and, perhaps more importantly, commercial relationship with the Chinese People's Government. British business interests in China were extensive and the failure to retain the ability to trade in the country would have damaging financial consequences for Her Majesty's Government. However, the tightening of Communist controls over capitalist activities in China meant that by the end of 1952 British business was being evicted. Foreign Office analysis is contained in Files FO 371/99282-298 and provides detailed information about the key events affecting British firms in China. Perhaps surprisingly, the tone of some of the reporting is optimistic about the chances of Britain's trade relationship with China continuing in the future. "This [the elimination of the private capitalist] does not mean, however, that foreign businessmen will be forced out of China immediately, nor that under more reasonable conditions there might not be a revival of trade between the UK and China, but it does mean, we suggest, that the "British Stake" in China will be under pressure. The aim of the Chinese will be to try and trade through a few government organisations and thereby eliminate the British middle man in China." (FO 371/99282 - Item FC1105/3)

In reality, the strength of the developing relationship between China and the USSR meant that economic relations with non-Communist nations were bound to suffer. The percentage of imports into China from the Soviet Union rose from 19.84% to 44.7% between 1950 and 1951. Conversely, imports from Western states to China fell from 78.79% to just 22.9% over the same period (FO 371/99229 - Item FC1011/1).

The burgeoning commercial and political alliance of Communist China with the USSR was one of the key developments of the Cold War period, and receives much attention in the 1952 files.

The creation of the Sino-Soviet Bloc on 14 February 1950 posed the biggest threat yet to the stability and security of the Western democracies. A celebratory speech by Chinese Premier Chou En Lai on the second anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty is recorded by a Foreign Office diplomat: "The great alliance, he said, between China and the Soviet Union, which had a combined population of 700 million, was an invincible force. The foundation of this profound friendship had been laid at the time of the October Revolution...When the People's Republic of China was founded, the Soviet Government had been the first to recognise it. During the past two years and more, the Soviet people and Government had given fraternal aid in China's work of construction. 'We Chinese people and Government express our profound gratitude for this great friendship and aid'." (FO 371/99265 - Item FC10338/7)

The wider availability of the 1952 Foreign Office Files for China opens up many new possibilities for research and sheds light upon the complex web of national and international repercussions that the Communist victory created. The files contain valuable material for those wishing to examine how events in China increased tensions between East and West. Scholars will also find the complete files of great assistance in studying a variety of topics including:

• Consolidation of Communist rule in China
• The effect of Chinese Communist rule on Sino-British relations
• Internal political, social and economic situation in China
• The Korean War
• Tensions between Britain and America over Far East policies
• Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist Government in Formosa
• British colonial and business interests in the Far East

These British files offer researchers an interesting insight into differences between British and American policy on China in this period. These materials both complement and add significantly to US State Department documents on China.

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