FOREIGN OFFICE FILES FOR CHINA, 1949-1976
(Public Record Office Classes FO 371 and FCO 21)

Part 5: Complete Files for 1953 (PRO Class FO 371/105188-105355)

Publisher's Note

This offers complete coverage of the FO 371 files covering China and Formosa for 1953. This year was again dominated by China's involvement in the Korean War, with a ceasefire eventually signed at Panmunjon. The hostilities had a crippling effect on the economy and put pressures on the leadership as it tried to carry through land and industrial reform. Nationwide planning began in 1953 as soon as political control had been established in rural and urban areas. The first Five Year Plan was introduced by the Chinese Government with an emphasis on capital construction and heavy industry. Official pronouncements suggested a determination to build a powerful industrial economy based upon the Soviet model. Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi were the key figures in pushing forward these policies under Mao Zedong.

The United States and Britain differed widely in their assessments of Beijing's intentions and capabilities, as reflected in their respective policies towards the recognition and containment of China. These files provide ample scope to study these differences.

American intransigence over the prisoner of war issue in the spring of 1953 threatened the prospects of an armistice in Korea. The Korean War and McCarthyism combined to keep US policy hostile to any reconciliation with Communist China. The Americans fixed upon a policy of political isolation, economic embargo, military encirclement, and nuclear harassment. British officials tried to moderate American policy and sought to remain on good terms with the Chinese Communist Government. Britain had considerable commercial interests in China and desired to protect Hong Kong's status and prosperity.

Eisenhower and Dulles were very keen to bring the costly Korean War to a close, but wanted to dictate terms that were acceptable to the West. To this end they were prepared to introduce new harsh measures against the Communists, including nuclear threats. Dulles told Eisenhower's assistant, Emmet John Hughes, in April 1953: "I don't think we can get much out of a Korean settlement until we have shown - before all Asia - our clear superiority by giving the Chinese one hell of a licking." The US decision to deneutralise the Formosan Straits in February 1953 put further pressure on Mao as it left the way open for Chiang Kai-shek's forces to attack the Chinese mainland.

The Chinese Government took all these threats seriously, but were also desperate to conclude a Korean peace settlement for economic and financial reasons. Researchers can examine the documents here to assess whether such financial issues had a greater bearing on the Chinese in moderating their stance on the prisoner of war issue compared to the intensified pressure from the Americans.

In his annual report from the British Embassy in Peking, Humphrey Trevelyan, comments:

"1953 marked the opening of a new phase in the development of the Chinese Communist State. Until the end of 1952 the Communists were principally occupied with consolidation of their power and defence against counter-revolution, the organisation of their administration, land reform and the restoration of pre-war production. In 1953 they set about building the new industrialised Socialist State. This year was the first year of the first Five-Year Plan. There has been mismanagement in the State industries and in the distribution of goods, and inadequate financial control, which gad been fully reported in the Chinese Press under the system of public confession; but it appears probable that the deficiencies are disproportionately emphasised in the non-Communist Press. Development will no doubt be uneven, and lacking in the administrative and technological refinements of more advanced countries: but it would be a mistake to discount the progress made.

The Chinese Communists show a determination to drive forward, while correcting their mistakes. They have the benefit of much Soviet experience and machinery. They have an iron control, exercised through Party officials, over the Trade Unions, which, as in the Soviet Union, have become a Department of the Government, mainly concerned with the increase of production. The testimony of British managers in Shanghai to the increased efficiency of their mills, factories and wharfs under the Communist control of labour is most striking. Financial stability has been maintained and there is increased confidence in the currency. In spite of all the mistakes, the country's industry is likely to develop fast..." (see FO 371/110194).

Trevelyan points out the considerable impact of the UN trade embargo:

"The United Nations Embargo remained in force throughout the year. The proportion of trade with the Communist bloc is said to have increased to 70%. There are political reasons for this diversion, but it must be due as much to denial by the West as to a deliberate act of Chinese policy. The Chinese are mainly interested in embargoed goods. They must want the Embargo lifted, not only to get supplies from the west, but also to increase their bargaining power with the Communist world, with which they are almost certainly trading on unfavourable terms." (see FO 371/110194).

There are many files on Formosa (Taiwan) concerning American policy, the deneutralisation of the Formosan Straits, and the impact on British trade and shipping in the region. The following extracts (again, see FO 371/110194) provide an account of British perceptions:

Tamsui (Formosa) Annual Political Review for 1953

"In 1953 the great preoccupation of the Nationalists was the attitude of the United States, of which each slight variation was highly magnified by their hopes and fears. The change to a Republican government, followed by the "deneutralisation" of the Formosa Straits in February, gave a violent boost to their morale, which was kept up by the promotion of the US Charg d' Affaires to Ambassador, and a constant stream of American VIP's (some of whom appear in the annexed list of events) almost all full of praise for Nationalist achievements and potential."

"There were forty-five instances of Nationalist interference with British merchant ships during the year. The pattern differed from that of 1952 in that the interference came more and more to be performed by ships of the regular Nationalist navy, not by guerrillas, and in that firing at British ships, with or without warning, became more prevalent. In the second half of the year, however, occasional visits of HM ships to the Formosa Straits were increased to a regular patrol; there were several brushes between British and Nationalist warships, and HMS Cockade had once to fire a warning shot, but on most occasions the offending Nationalist vessel made off as soon as one of HM ships came in sight or into radio contact.."

The situation improved towards the end of the year.

"British trade in and with Formosa continued to flourish throughout the year, obstructed by only minor forms of discrimination, such as refusals to renew expired British trade-marks, to allow British ships plying between Hong Kong and Formosa to call at more than one Formosan port, and to permit British merchants to participate in sugar sales to Malaya.."

The political situation in Formosa is covered in FO 371/105200-105203; reactions to the change in US policy with the deneutralisation of the Formosan Straits can be found in FO 371/105196-105198. Other files concentrate on the future of Formosa, its economic situation, and the US support for Chiang Kai-shek's regime.

A series of files, FO 371/105191-105195, provide extensive detail on the internal political situation in China. FO 371/105189 offers a summary of events from December 1952 to May 1953.

The summary for the period 23 December 1952 to 12 January 1953 states: "Interest was mainly devoted to internal affairs. There was the definite announcement by Chou-En Lai that a five year plan would begin in 1953 and his proposal for the summoning of an All China People's Congress in 1953. The New Year was seen in with the handing over of the North Eastern Chang-chun Railway to the Chinese. Further representations were made to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about difficulties met by British firms in trying to close.."

The summary for the period 6 May to 26 May 1953 confirms: "Interest during this period centred on the armistice negotiations in Korea and the increasing hostility of the Chinese press to the attitude of the UN (generally referred to as American) negotiators on the prisoner of war question.."

FO 371/105192 provides the text of Chou-En-Lai's Political Report of 4 February 1953:

"The Chinese people's struggle to resist American aid to Korea must be continued and intensified and China's defensive strength further consolidated and raised. We must mobilise the whole people to press on with increased production, practise economy, to work hard, so as to support the great struggle to resist American aid to Korea. The people of the whole world have clearly seen that China has victoriously completed the period of economic rehabilitation and entered that of large scale planned construction, that the Chinese people are filled with enthusiasm for peaceful construction and the desire to maintain a lasting peace.. If the new American Government still desires to end the Korean War by peaceful means, then it should resume the Panmunjom negotiations unconditionally.."

On 7 February 1953, Mao officially responded to American threats by declaring at the Fourth Session of the first National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference:

"First, we must intensify the struggle to resist the US and aid Korea. Because American imperialism persists in holding Chinese and Korean prisoners of war and undermining the cease-fire negotiations and, moreover, is vainly attempting to expand its war of aggression against Korea, the struggle to resist the US and aid Korea must continue to be intensified. We desire peace, but as long as American imperialism does not discard its barbaric and unreasonable demands and its plots to expand its aggression, the resolution of the Chinese people can only be to continue to fight together with the Korean people to the end. This is not because we like war; we would like to stop the war immediately and wait to resolve the remaining problems in the future, but American imperialism doesn't want to do things this way. If that's the case, that's all right; we'll continue to fight."

British reports from Peking to the Foreign Office, 9 February 1953, also cover this session of the Political Consultative Conference and state that it concluded with the issuing by Mao of a three point directive; Embassy comments are in brackets:

"(a) Uncompromising declaration of China's determination to fight on, on the grounds that American Imperialists are determined to hold the Chinese and Korean prisoners, are sabotaging the armistice talks and wildly trying to expand the Korean War. (The declaration, which is in simple language calculated to evoke response amongst the Chinese common people, is the culmination of several weeks' propaganda evidently designed to give the Chinese people second wind for the struggle after temporary let-up whilst the Indian resolution was afoot).

(b) Exhortation to study Soviet technique to further national construction, needs no comment.

(c) Call to oppose bureaucracy. (After several recent developments pointing in this direction Mao has laid the stage for intensive push designed to make all levels of the administration fitter for their tasks. It will be recalled that Mao himself initiated the fiercest phase of the anti-corruption drive in January, 1952. Since the Central People's Government was formed no ministers have been dropped, but some upset now seems imminent both of party and non-party men. At the root it is a question of confidence of the people in the administration, and this evidently needs serious attention just now. Onset of the programme of industrialization has also revealed the inadequacy of many officials).."

There are a good number of files on China's economy, industrial development and the introduction of collective agreements to fulfil the Five Year Plan, 1953-1957; please see FO 371/105232-105236.

British trade with China was a principal concern for British officials, with particular reference to shipping, British companies operating in China, trade with Macau and Hong Kong, events in the Shanghai region, and the trade agreement between China and the Soviet Union. Many files include material on this topic, but see FO 371/105248A-105256 and FO 371/105259-105266 in particular.

It is clear from a number of documents that the Communist Government had to take firm measures to obtain full control of some urban and rural districts in order to effectively pursue its policies. There several press reports about two major uprisings:

Extract from "Free China Information", 5 March 1953

30,000 Peasans Revolt in Kansu, Yunnan

"Two separate uprisings involving 10,000 and 20,000 peasants were reported, one in Yunnan province in south western China and the other in Kansu province in north western China.

The 10,000-man insurrection in Yunnan province took place early this month when eight counties fell into the hands of anti-Communist fighters. The Taipei Ta Tao News Agency, which has underground sources in Communist China, identified the eight counties as Cheli, Fuhai, Nanchiao, Chenyueh, Szemao, Liushun, Kiangchen and Ningerh. The counties form a triangular area in south western Yunnan, near the Indo-China and Burma border, where guerrillas are reported to have been active.

The agency said that Communist troops and militiamen had joined the revolt, and at least 2,000 of the men who took up arms against the Communists proved to be well trained. Large numbers of Red officials and cadres had fled the area.

The other anti-Red uprising was reported by the official Communist paper, the Sian Masses Daily, published in Shensi province. A copy of the October 21st, 1952, issue of the paper, which appeared in Hong Kong recently, admitted that it had taken the Communists four months to put down the uprising. Starting last April, the resistance movement quickly grew into a force of 20,000 peasants involving three towns in Kansu province.In the biggest revolt ever reported since the Communists overrun the mainland, the agency said in its last November release that over 3,000 Communist troops and political workers were killed and over 1,000 houses burned down. It said the guerrillas were in occupation of Haiyuan county, about 100 miles north east of Lanchow, in eastern Kansu; Yenchih, a town west of Haiyuan; and Liwang-pao, another town east of Haiyuan, which is just within the western border of the neighbouring Ningsia province.." (see FO 371/105192).

The next folder comments on developments in China, 1-14 February 1953, with reference to the Five Year Plan: "General propaganda paints a picture of China on the road to a successful and orthodox people's regime with growing political and economic strength under Soviet aid and guidance...."

It includes Shanghai Radio reports on the 1st-7th Military Tribunals of Shanghai Control Commission from the BBC Monitor, 28 April 1953, stating that sentences were passed on "a number of counter-revolutionary culprits in Shanghai. More than ninety thousand workers, farmers, students, and others attended these tribunals to witness the sentencing of the criminals."

The reports contain large doses of propaganda, but it is clear that 236 people were sentenced.

"the culprits were indicted by Public Procurators for constant subversive activities against the People's Revolution, for being sent to Shanghai by American Imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek bandits as secret agents, for armed resistance against the People's Government as members of reactionary parties or groups, for overt robbery, murder, and arson of public property, as bandits of manslaughter, rape, usurping of property, and extortion as vicious ruffians, and for sneaking into Shanghai after having escape from their native localities as counter-revolutionary elements.."
(see FO 371/105193).

Also in the same file is a letter from the British Embassy, Peking to the Foreign Office, 14 May 1953, providing brief summaries on the Chinese Government's internal propaganda programme. A sub-file, dated June 23, covers the opening of the Congress of the New Democratic Youth League in Peking and the text of speeches of prominent people to mark the occasion. There is a nine page review, by L H Lamb, on the internal situation in China, as it has developed in the course of the last two years, dated 16 June 1953:

"the ideological emphasis of current policy and publicity is of course on workers, women and children. The last named being very susceptible to indoctrination and seduction through a sense of self-importance, have perhaps replaced the student body as the pampered favourites of the regime. Through the privileged Young Pioneer Corps, now said to have some seven million members, the children of China are being assiduously cultivated to secure the Communist succession and to act as act as agents against deviationism in the home.." (see FO 371/105193).

Political relations between China and the Soviet Union, after the death of Stalin, are covered in a series of important documents in FO 371/105220. This includes various sub-files such as the document dated 16 February on the third anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, papers on the whereabouts of Chinese Officials, the speech by Liu Shaoqi saying that the main purpose of the Sino-Soviet Treaty is to ensure peace in the Far East, and a document dated 3 March giving an account of Soviet relations with the Chinese: "recent statements by senior members of Chinese Government concentrate on importance of close association between USSR and China."

It is probable that the Communist leadership in China discussed the Korean situation at length with the Soviet leadership. This helped pave the way for progress on the prisoners of war issue after General Clark had proposed an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners on February 22. Agreement on this issue was reached on April 11. After further bargaining an armistice was signed on July 27.

A long sequence of files covers cases of Chinese Nationalist interference with British and other shipping, see FO 371/105282-105289.

Other interesting files include material on:

• Developments in China's agriculture: report on production in the years 1949-1952 and observations on the 1953 harvest
• Textile mills in China
• Sino-Soviet Petroleum Company's activities in Sinkiang
• Fishing industry in Formosa
• Sugar industry in Formosa
• Proposed enlargement of the Trade Commission in Hong Kong
• Daily News Releases of the New China News Agency covering fortnightly periods in March and
  May 1953
• Reports and articles by Mao Tse-Tung on military matters and plans for economic development of
  China, with translation into Chinese of the works of Stalin
• Visit to Formosa by US General Mark Clark, Commander UN Forces in Korea, accompanied by General Shoosmith, his British Deputy Chief of Staff

A number of files provide details on various Chinese personalities. FO 371/105345 reports on movements of Chang Wen Tien, the Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union. FO 371/110193 has details on Aitchen K Wu, friend of Chou en Lai. There is also material on Thomas Liao and the Formosan Democratic Independence Party. Their petition was submitted to the Far Eastern Peace Conference in Geneva in August 1954. A final sub-file deals with differing views on the recognition of China. Arthur Lewis, MP writes to the Foreign Secretary about questions from a friend in the US.

The wider availability of all these files, made possible by this microfilm edition, opens up many new possibilities for research and sheds light upon events in China in 1953. The files in Part 5 offer a fascinating insight into the Communist Government's commitment to the Five Year plan and show the resilience of China as an emerging global superpower. The documents enable researchers to ponder questions such as China's increasing reliance on the Soviet Union, the factors forcing the Chinese to agree to an armistice in the Korean War, and to assess the successes and problems of industrial and agrarian reforms.

With access to full coverage of all 1953 Foreign Office Files for China, academics will be able to research topics such as:

• the Korean War and armistice negotiations
• the economic situation in Formosa
• the Chinese Communist threat to Hong Kong
• Chinese anti-Western propaganda
• the United Nations imposition of political and economic sanctions
• international trade relations
• the Chinese economy and the first Five Year Plan
• Chinese military machinations
• American support for Formosa
• British firms and commercial interests operating in China

These British files offer researchers an interesting insight into differences between British and American policy on China in this period. These materials both complement and add significantly to US State Department documents on China.

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