FOREIGN OFFICE FILES FOR CUBA
(Public Record Office Class FO 371)
Part 2: Cuba and the Bay of Pigs Invasion, 1961
(PRO Classes FO 371/156137-156255 & PREM 11/3316, 3321 & 3328)
Publisher's Note
Part 2 of this microfilm project provides the Foreign Office Files for Cuba for 1961. Beginning with the breaking of diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba on January 3rd, the files contain detailed reports, memoranda and correspondence relating to events that had worldwide repercussions. Together these documents provide a British perspective on a year that saw John F Kennedy take office and the CIA-backed Bay of Pigs invasion.
Fidel Castro had been in power since January 1st 1959, when the Foreign Office Annual Review for 1960 (FO 371/162308) described the events in Cuba as establishing “a form of communism in the New World in a shape and strength that must, I believe, affect the course of history in the whole of Latin America, whatever may be the ultimate fate of the present regime in Cuba.”. This tone is echoed throughout the files and gives the reader a sense of the genuine significance of the events being discussed. A reading of the 1961 files also helps to understand how the world was brought to the brink of nuclear war in November 1962.
Much of the content of the files refers to the internal political situation in Cuba and relates that to the efforts in America to launch a counter-revolution to the Castro regime. This struggle climaxed with the attempted invasion by Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs between the 17th and 20th April. Documents from the period prior to the invasion contain the first indications from British diplomats about an imminent invasion (FO 371/156140). It is then possible to follow the growing momentum amongst the counter-revolutionary movement through to the invasion itself and international reactions to it (FO 371/156142-FO 371/156146). The British Foreign Office enlisted the support of locals to get news of events and a report from Nicaragua, 25 April 1961, (FO 371/156142 - item AK1015/98) reveals the level of US and Nicaraguan assistance. It gives an account of “two objectively minded travellers (one American, one Nicaraguan) who arrived in Managua from Bluefields” and reported that “all fighting men and landing craft have gone and that the airfield …is littered with a large quantity of American supplies which were originally intended for the Cuban beach-head...The American also brought back a report, for what it is worth, that the United States were contemplating asking the Nicaraguan Government to allow them to establish a major airbase at Puerto Cabezas to reinforce that at Guantanamo.”
The invasion failed and resulted in the death of 114 Cuban émigrés and the capture of 1,189 others by Castro’s forces. A conversation between Edward Heath (Lord Privy Seal at the time) and Arthur Schlesinger (Special Assistant to Kennedy) reveals how the plan was approved despite objections from some quarters, “Mr Schlesinger said that the plan for an invasion of the island by volunteer Cuban forces was worked out under the Eisenhower administration. It only came up to Kennedy after he had been in office for some time. He directed that it be submitted to the Chiefs of Staff, who said that it was militarily sound. The CIA confirmed the intelligence estimate on which it was based. Mr Adlar Stevenson, Mr Bowles and Senator Fulbright were all opposed to it but Mr Rusk never objected to it at any stage.” (FO 371/156145 - item AK1015/152).
Although the plan had been formulated while Eisenhower was still President, its failure was a humiliation for the new Kennedy administration. A Foreign Office ‘post-mortem’ on the invasion reflects on the damage caused, “this early set-back will have a profound effect on the President. He will understandably be on the look-out for a chance to get even with the Communists, though with Mr Rusk at his elbow, he is unlikely to act irresponsibly. He will redouble his efforts to bring the wayward American government machine under control and in the process there will be a shift of power within the government and a modification of the President’s hitherto essentially personal direction of affairs.” (FO 371/156145, Caccia to Home, 1 May 1961).
An insight into why the Bay of Pigs invasion may have failed can be found in a file dedicated to the testimonies of anti-Castro exiles (FO 371/156154). Several accounts hint at divisions between the counter-revolutionaries and the CIA, which may have hampered the operation. One report from the New York Times on July 18th quotes an exile as accusing the CIA of ‘repeated interference’ in their affairs. This account from a member of the ‘Movement of the People’ highlights the discord that existed between two key elements in the struggle against Castro.
Criticism for American involvement in the invasion of Cuba was widespread throughout Latin America. Anti-US riots took place in several state capitals and government officials were strongly opposed to US interference in Cuban affairs. There is some evidence that the response in Haiti was less vocal than in other countries and the following extract shows that Castro himself was encouraging anti-American demonstrations, “The great majority of those Haitians who are politically conscious were indignant from the start over what they took for granted to be United States intervention in Cuba. They are delighted that the invasion failed. Most, if not all, the Ministers share these views, but they have been very discreet in discussing the subject. There has been no public expression of the Government’s attitude. There has been no public expression of the Government’s attitude. There have been no demonstrations and the fact that Castro himself sent a message to the Rector of the University urging him to organise a manifestation by students has been kept a close secret”. (File 371/156142 - item AK1015/96).
Arguments about American involvement in the Bay of Pigs invasion reached the highest diplomatic level when Cuba made an official complaint to the United Nations. Debate raged within the UN General Assembly about the extent to which the United States was behind the events (FO 371/156182– 185). Cuban complaints were eventually met with a response from the US that the invasion was the work of internal dissidents. This claim failed to convince supporters of the Castro regime and the Soviet newspaper Pravda dismissed it as ‘slanderous’.
(F0 371/156197 - item AK103145/82).
As President Kennedy attempted to undo some of the political damage caused by events in April 1961, he recognised the importance of keeping the American newspaper editors on his side. File FO 371/156180 discusses the reporting of the Bay of Pigs invasion by the US press and the pessimistic tone that they took. Following that is the transcript of a speech made by the President to the American Society of Newspapers Editors on April 20th which emphasises the significance of the relationship between politicians and the media, even in 1961, “The President of a great democracy such as ours and the editors of great newspapers such as yours owe a common obligation to the people - an obligation to present the facts, to present them with candour and to present them in perspective.” (Item AK103145/120).
Britain was more than a bystander to the events in Cuba — she had colonial and commonwealth interests in British Guyana and the Caribbean and wished to preserve the ‘special relationship’ with America, whilst striving to maintain trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba. Therefore, a large number of files record the effects of the Cuban revolution on British relations with other Latin American states, as well as the US (FO 371/156156—371/156196). Whereas America had withdrawn her diplomats from Cuba in January 1961, Britain had kept representatives on the ground. This allowed the Foreign Office to record changes in the political atmosphere in Cuba and assess how these would affect neighbouring states. A Foreign Office representative in Havana reports in September 1961 that, “Since I last reported on the strength of opposition to the Government there has been an increase in the tension and an apparent spread of disillusionment into the poorer classes. Continual food shortages are probably the main cause of discontent.” (FO 371/156151 - item AK1015257).
Several files in Part 2 deal with Cuba’s economic position following the revolution. Her commercial relations with other Communist states, as well as the UK, are discussed in some detail. Together these documents provide valuable information to those wishing to look at the Cuban Revolution from a socio-economic perspective. File FO 371/156218 contains particularly
interesting information on the sale of arms to Cuba and introduces fundamental questions regarding British trade with Cuba.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the 1961 files is the opportunity they offer to hear the voices of some of the key protagonists of the Cold War era. Several documents contain transcripts of speeches from Fidel Castro and Che Guevara and conversations between Kennedy and Khrushchev. This allows for a greater understanding of the political agendas of the individuals involved and helps to assess their impact on the course of history. The words of Guevara, one of the most famous Cuban revolutionaries, appear several times in the files. His article from Verde Olivo on April 9th, the magazine of the Cuban Armed Forces, carries a celebratory tone that is typical of his writing at the time, “Never in America has there been an event with such extraordinary characteristics, such deep roots, and such transcendental consequences for the destiny of progressive movements in this continent as our revolutionary way. So much so, that it has been classed by some as the most important event in American history, and one which is next in importance to the trilogy consisting of the Russian Revolution, the triumph over Hitler’s forces with the social changes which followed, and the victory of the Chinese Revolutionary Force.”
(FO 371/156143. Item AK1015/105).
This part of the Foreign Office Files covers the events of 1961 in great detail and includes all correspondence and reports on the unfolding situation between the US and Cuba. These documents are valuable for comparing the British and American experiences of the Cuban Revolution. The material could be used in conjunction with American documents to gain two nations’ perspectives on events in Cuba. In particular, they would complement the US State Department Files and material in the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
Included in Part 2 are a number of files from the Prime Minister’s Office series (PREM 11) detailing discussions about Cuba at the highest level. These include Prime Ministerial briefings on Cuba and records of meetings and conversations between Macmillan, Khrushchev and Kennedy.
Part 2 offers numerous possibilities for research and would enable scholars to explore individual events of the Cold War era and understand the impact they had on international diplomatic relations. Questions that could be investigated include: To what extent had Cuba become part of the Sino-Soviet Bloc by 1961? How did the Bay of Pigs invasion impact on British relations with America? How did events in Cuba in 1961 add momentum to the nuclear arms race of the Cold War era?
Files offered include:
• Annual Review for 1960
• The internal political situation in Cuba
• Political relations with nations such as the US, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, China, the Soviet Union and the Commonwealth countries
• The conditions for anti-Castro refugees in the Bahamas and Jamaica
• The Cuban economy including currency, banking and foreign trade
• Commercial relations between Cuba and nations such as China, Morocco, Romania, Poland, the Soviet Union, the US and Britain
• Sale of arms to Cuba
• Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba
• Broadcasting to and from Cuba
• Political asylum for refugees from Cuba
• Visit to UK of Cuban Foreign Minister
• Papers on meetings between President Kennedy and Mr Khrushchev, Vienna, June 1961
• Meetings between Prime Minister and President Kennedy, Washington, April 1961
• Visit of President Kennedy to UK, June 1961
The Foreign Office Files for Cuba ultimately suggest that 1961 was a year in which the intentions of the US to remove Communist influence from Cuba achieved the opposite effect. Fidel Castro recognised the political advantages of encouraging anti-American feeling in Latin America and, in doing so, consolidated his own position within Cuba. By the end of 1961, British officials report that Cuba is a country strengthening its links with the Soviet Union and spreading Communist sympathy throughout the continent.
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