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FOREIGN OFFICE FILES FOR CUBA
(Public Record Office Class FO 371)


Part 3: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
(PRO Classes FO371/162308-162436, 168135 & PREM 11/3689-3691)

Publisher's Note

Part 3 of this microfilm project provides the Foreign Office Files for Cuba for 1962. The files contain detailed reports, memoranda and correspondence relating to events that had worldwide repercussions. These documents provide a British perspective on the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was perhaps the most alarming incident of the Cold War period, bringing the United States and the USSR into an “eyeball-to-eyeball” confrontation in the autumn of 1962.

The Annual Review for 1961 (FO 371/162308) warned that: “A form of communism has been established in Cuba which cannot fail to affect the whole of Latin America. Officially designated the ‘Year of Education’, 1961 was in fact the year of widespread indoctrination. The pattern of the new social and political structure is single party police state, communist type, under the rule of the United party of the revolution. It operates at all levels and in all fields through mass revolutionary organisations. This is the strength of the regime.” The United States sought to combat this regime through the intensification of their embargo on Cuba. Following a vote at the Organisation of American States Conference at Punta de Este at the end of January 1962, Cuba was expelled from the OAS. Cuba complained to the UN Security Council and asked for the OAS dispute to be submitted to the International Court of Justice. Cuba’s requests were rejected by the UN Security Council.

By the summer of 1962, significant movements of Soviet personnel and equipment into Cuba had aroused the American suspicions. US Navy ships and aircraft began to photograph every Soviet vessel bound for Cuba. U-2 reconnaissance flights covered the entire island twice each month and a special daily intelligence report was started on August 27. On September 13, President Kennedy warned Khrushchev: “If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way… or if Cuba should ever … become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.”

On 14 October 1962 Major Richard Heyser’s reconnaissance flight over Cuba came back with hard photographic evidence of medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) launch sites in Cuba. Kennedy immediately reached a decision - the missiles would have to be removed. By the next evening all of the key figures in the Kennedy administration had been tracked down and informed of the discovery of the missiles. They debated the options of a single surgical air strike on the missile bases; an attack on various Cuban facilities; a comprehensive series of attacks and invasions; or the ‘quarantine’ or blockade of Cuba.

The stationing of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba, barely ninety miles off the tip of Florida, brought home the realities of nuclear warfare. The Soviet Union had transported 42 MRBMs to Cuba with sufficient range to reach New York, Chicago, Washington and other major American cities. US armed forces worldwide were placed on alert and forces were deployed for a possible air strike against Cuba followed by a land invasion. On the morning of 22 October 1962, De Gaulle, Macmillan and Home, were briefed by their individual US ambassadors. Macmillan was said to have stated: “Now the Americans will realise what we here in England have lived through for the past many years.” Both the French and British governments hastened to offer their backing to the United States for a ‘quarantine’ policy. Macmillan and Kennedy stayed in close contact throughout the crisis, speaking to each other on the telephone as much as three times a day and many of those conversations are recorded in the files in full. There are also details of exchanges between Kennedy, Khrushchev and Macmillan. A poll taken on 23 October showed that one in five Americans believed that the quarantine would result in World War III. The OAS and European allies, including Britain, expressed unanimous support for the American quarantine policy. The Pentagon continued with its plans for massive air strikes and a land invasion of Cuba.

Negotiations with Khrushchev continued for a week. The crisis ended on October 28 when Khrushchev promised to withdraw the missiles if America promised not to invade Cuba at a later date. By a separate agreement, US missiles in Turkey were also removed.

On 2 November 1962 President Kennedy gave a brief address to the nation concluding that on the basis of aerial photographs the Cuban missile bases were being dismantled and their missiles and other related equipment were being crated. However, the naval quarantine was not lifted until 21 November, following Khrushchev’s decision to remove all IL-28 bombers from Cuba, thus ending the most fraught period in Cold War history. A Foreign Office observer shared in the relief, but saw Khrushchev’s actions as: “the world’s most public snub to the world’s most publicised prima donna. I myself saw Castro soon after the event. He was sallow, haggard and thin, mentally and physically deflated. Never has a prime minister had to undergo so agonizing a period of adjustment to unpalatable facts and never has one behaved in so unorthodox a fashion. He went off sulking like a small boy and took no further viable part for the next six weeks in the affairs of state.” (FO 371/168135)

The Annual Review for 1962 (FO 371/168135) also records the unexpected nature of the crisis relative to an assessment of the first few months of the year:

“This year … the world’s most dramatic event took place here on our own doorstep and this time I must admit, it was we in Cuba who seemed unfortunately to have been unaware of what was going on - as United States photographic reconnaissance later revealed. But even with the full benefit of hind-sight I find it difficult, in reviewing the local scene over these last 12 months, to piece together a probable and coherent sequence of events which can be seen to have led up to that most improbable piece of history, the story of the Cuban missile bases. In fact, life in Cuba in the first months of 1962, the so-called Year of Planning, seemed to us at the time to be slipping into a minor key. The colourful cult of personality which in this country means the glorification of Fidel Castro, had been officially declared a bad thing by none other than Castro himself and the first tentative experiment in collective leadership which took its place was proving a relatively drab alternative. The government seemed determined as far as possible to get the country back to normal, to give it a more stable, less revolutionary look. The Militia was sent back to school and to work and there were fewer beards, guns and uniforms to be seen in the streets. After the plastic bombs, sabotage and the invasion scares of 1960 and the real invasion and mass arrests of 1961, life in the first six months seemed almost dull.”

The summer months saw a definite change with the gradual build up of Soviet shipments to Cuba.
However, there was no intelligence from within Cuba about the MRBMs, before the findings of US reconnaissance flights provided incontrovertible evidence.

The following is a list of the range of FO 371 files included in this part of the microfilm project:

- Annual Reviews for 1961 and 1962
- The internal political situation in Cuba
- The US blockade of Cuba
- Soviet military aid to Cuba
- Cuban armed forces
- Political relations between Cuba and the United States, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,   Mexico, Uraguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, Poland, China, and the Soviet Union
- NATO
- Activities of anti-Castro exiles
- Activities of counter-revolutionaries in Cuba
- The economic situation in Cuba and foreign trade
- Commercial relations between Cuba and China, Czechoslovakia, Cambodia, Poland, and the Soviet Union
- The impact of the crisis on trade between Cuba and the United States
- The impact of the crisis on trade between Britain and Cuba
- Treatment of prisoners in Cuban gaols
- Foreign policy of Cuba, including appeals to the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice
- Communism in Cuba
- Intelligence and Press information on Cuba
- Propaganda
- Education in Cuba
- Visit to Soviet Union of Guevara and Aragones

We also include three PREM 11 files with crucial material on the Cuban Missile Crisis. These cover UN Security Council discussions, detailed telephone conversations between Kennedy and Macmillan, the US blockade of Cuba, NATO deliberations, exchanges with Khrushchev, deliberations on resolving the crisis, and discussions concerning the impact on the situation in Berlin and other Cold War tensions.

A personal message to the Prime Minister from the British Ambassador in Washington DC records on 23 October: “You will now have seen my telegram No.2636 reporting my talk with the President. It was quite clear to me during this talk that the President does not expect or intend that the present course of action should lead on to an American seizure of Cuba. Indeed, he said that having passed up this chance, he could see no likelihood of their ever being offered an equally good excuse for an invasion. This indicates his mood, but he was probably guilty of some exaggeration because I suppose there is always the chance of a clash over the Guantanamo base or between United States and Cuban ships. Nevertheless I have no doubt that he has no present intention of trying to seize Cuba. Indeed, you will see that since I spoke to him he had decided to reduce the scope of the blockade...” (PREM 11/3689)

A record of a conversation between President Kennedy and the British Prime Minister at 12.30am on Tuesday 23 October runs as follows:

President Kennedy
“Prime Minister, I’m glad to talk to you and I appreciate your messages today. I’ve just finished giving my speech. I’m sorry to confront you with all the problems that are going to come out of it, but our strong feeling was that after my statements to them against bringing missiles in after their frequent statements that they weren’t, the fact that this was done in a wholly clandestine way would have left us in November when Mr Khrushchev was planning to come over - he kept saying that he was waiting till after the elections but obviously he was waiting to so substantially increase his military power that it would have, we think, just unhinged all of Latin America and thrown into question any of our statements about Berlin.”

Prime Minister
“Yes, I quite see that. What’s worrying me is how do you see the way out of this? What are you going to do with the blockade? Are you going to occupy Cuba and have done with it or is it going to just drag on?”

President Kennedy
“We could not occupy Cuba for some days and we are preparing a potential for that kind of action if it’s necessary but we didn’t start off with that action for two reasons. First because there has to be a gap of some days to assemble the forces which of course will always be public information. And secondly because we want to see a little where we begin to go on this road. We don’t know what’s going to happen in Berlin - we don’t know what’s going to happen any place else. This seemed to be the action we could take which would lessen the chance of an immediate escalation into war though of course it could bring that result.”


Prime Minister
“Yes, that’s quite true. Is your blockade going to extend beyond the military and arms into things like oil and all the rest of it in order to bring down the Castro Government?”


President Kennedy
“At the beginning we’re going to confine ourselves to offensive weapons of war in order not to give him a complete justification for Berlin. In other words we’re not shipping offensive weapons of war into Berlin so we’re just confining it to that. But it may be that within the next few days we may need to move it to petroleum, oils, lubricants and other things but we don’t want to do that just now because it gives him an obvious tit for tat in Berlin.”


Prime Minister
“What do you think Khrushchev’s action will be? In the United Nations to start with or some action of a positive kind?”


President Kennedy
“He may do what you suggest and make us stop one of his ships by force and then take some action in Berlin. He could seize Berlin or he could put on a blockade there and there are any number of things he could do. We just have to expect that whatever it’s going to be it’s going to be unpleasant. But I don’t think anybody is able to predict with certainty what he will do right now but I would suspect that he will do something unpleasant to us in Berlin which I think he is going to do anyway.” (PREM 11/3689)

There were many conversations in the next few days. The following is an extract from a conversation between the Prime Minister and President Kennedy which started at 11.15pm on Friday 26 October covering ideas on a possible negotiated solution:

Prime Minister
“The idea that you have just mentioned is that Cuba might be made like Belgium was by international guarantee - an inviolable country and all of us would guarantee its neutrality and inviolability. Is that a possibility?”


President Kennedy
“That is a matter which seems to me we ought to be thinking about and we will be talking about that in the next 24 hours as to whether there is any room for a settlement on that basis. Probably with Castro in power it would leave the Russians perhaps free to ship in a good deal more offensive equipment and they have shipped in a good deal. We now find a good many self-propelled armoured vehicles with very sophisticated special equipment and so on but it may be a possibility. I shall probably give you more information about that tomorrow night but at least there have been a couple of hints but not enough to go on yet.”


Prime Minister
“Yes, now I thought another possibility was that U Thant might himself propose to the United Nations, which I believe they would accept, that he should go with a team and ensure that these missiles were made inoperable during the period of any conference or discussion.”


President Kennedy
“Yes, that is correct. There would have to be some technical way of determining that these weapons were being made inoperable and that work on the sites was ceasing during these conversations, that is correct.”


Prime Minister
“Yes, but do you think that U Thant … I am quite sure that Hammarskjold would have done such a thing. Mightn’t he suggest to the United Nations that he would do this? He would go and do it with a team and see that they were not operable during the period of the talks.”


President Kennedy
“Yes, there is some suggestion of that. Also they want to inspect some of the refugee camps in Florida and Nicaragua, Guatemala and Swan Island. That was the summing up of the conversation with the Governor and I am looking into it. I don’t think we have got anything going there that would be difficult to inspect but this is all part of the political proposals which are now being looked at in view of the Governor’s conversation. So I would sum it up, Prime Minister, by saying that by tomorrow morning or noon we should be in a position of knowing whether there is some political proposal that we could agree to and whether the Russians are interested in it or not. We will know a little more I think by tomorrow afternoon. In the meanwhile the quarantine stays, if he doesn’t send ships in. We let a ship pass this afternoon but there are no other ships within 48 hours or so so we don’t expect any problems on the sea. The problem that concerns us is the continued build-up and I issued a statement on that today. I think I can probably get you a little more precise information on the various political proposals and U Thant’s conversation with Stevenson. I’ll send you a report of that tonight and then you will have it in the morning.”


Prime Minister
“There is just a third point that occurred to us. If we want to help the Russians to save face would it be worthwhile our undertaking to immobilise our Thor missiles which are here in England during the same period - during the conference.”


President Kennedy
“Well, let me put that into the machinery and then I’ll be in touch with you on that.”


Prime Minister
“I think it is just an idea that it might help the Russians to accept.”

President Kennedy
“Sure, Prime Minister, let me send that over to the Department. I think we don’t want to have too many dismantlings but it is possible that that proposal might help; they might also insist on Greece, on Turkey and Italy but I will keep in mind your suggestion here so that if it gets into that it may be advantageous.”


Prime Minister
“Yes, I don’t see why they should ask for more because we have got sixty so that missile for missile you see there wouldn’t be as many as that in Cuba.” (PREM 11/3690)

On 28 October Macmillan sent the following message to Khrushchev (PREM 11/3691):


“Dear Mr Chairman,
I have now had an opportunity to study your letter of yesterday to President Kennedy and his reply. The essence of the position reached is that once the problem posed by the offensive missile bases in Cuba has been dealt with under effective United Nations control and the situation in the area normalised, the way would be open for us all to work towards a more general arrangement regarding armaments. For instance, we should be able to reach an early conclusion of an agreement about the banning of tests of nuclear weapons on which much progress has already been made, as well as to give firm directives to settle the main elements in the first stage of disarmament. I would hope that this might mark a new determination to resolve the problems from which the world is suffering. I therefore ask you to take the action necessary to make all this possible. This is an opportunity which we should seize.
Yours sincerely
Harold Macmillan”

A further document in PREM 11/3691 (see folios 14 and 15) looks at the relation between the Cuba and Berlin situations and warns as follows:


“… So far as Berlin is concerned the significant feature of the Cuba affair is that Khrushchev unquestionably backed-off when the chips were seen to be down. We know this; Khrushchev knows it; and a large part of effective world opinion, in neutral and bloc areas as well as in the West, also noted it. If, during an apparent moratorium, the West should insist on raising the Berlin issue with a view to obtaining advantage without the offer of any notable fresh concession (and I take it that recent events will have confirmed Franco-German opposition to the offer of any concessions which could possibly attract Khrushchev) it would appear to Khrushchev, and not to him alone, that we believed he was on the run and could therefore be squeezed with impunity. He has frequently boasted that the Soviet Union is not to be treated as an inferior Power and pushed around, and I believe he would be bound to dig his toes in. We might then find ourselves facing an even more acute crisis than that over Cuba; in an area where the Soviet local position is much stronger and Soviet vital interests much greater; and therefore with smaller likelihood of another Soviet retreat.”

This project covers the crisis in great detail - including all correspondence and reports within the British Foreign Office on the unfolding events between the United States and Cuba. Britain was more than a bystander - she had colonial and commonwealth interests in British Guyana and the Caribbean and wished to preserve the ‘special relationship’ with America, whilst striving to maintain trade and diplomatic relations in the region.

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