FOREIGN OFFICE FILES FOR JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST
Series Two: British Foreign Office Files for Post-War Japan
(Public Record Office Class FO 371 & FCO 21)
Part 6: Complete files for 1966-1968
(PRO Class FO 371/187076-187142 & FCO 21/238-299)
Part 7: Complete files for 1969-1971
(PRO Class FCO 21/555-593, 636-639, 720-769, 798-800 & 877-926)
PUBLISHER'S NOTE
“These British Archives provide invaluable analyses of Japan’s social, economic and political development, and fully document her changing relations with Britain and the Commonwealth.”
Dr Gordon Daniels
Reader in Modern Far Eastern History, University of Sheffield
and President of the European Association
of Japanese Resource Specialists
Continuing the microfilm collection of Foreign Office Files for Japan Series Two, Part 6 documents the years 1966, 1967 and 1968 and contains a wealth of information from the British Foreign Office Central Political Files. Drawing on reports, memoranda, despatches, official instructions and regular communications between the Foreign Office and the British Embassy and Consulates in Japan, many of the most pressing issues of the day are discussed and appraised. Subjects covered range in scope from Annual reports and fortnightly summaries of events in Japan, to foreign relations and Japanese political, social and economic issues.
During this period, Japan was still governed by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and, after the resignation of Hayato Ikeda in November 1964, was under the premiership of Eisaku Sato. Building upon the success and prosperity of the Ikeda years, Japan had emerged from its post-war seclusion to become one of the world’s major industrial countries; in the financial year 1965-66, its GNP had become the third largest in the world. As file FCO 21/242 documents, “The Japanese people will probably continue to get richer faster than the people of any other country.”
As the 1960s progressed, trading with both western and eastern nations became important in order for Japan to maintain its high profile on the world economic stage. The Sato administration was well aware that their continued industrial growth depended heavily on good foreign relations. Although full diplomatic links with the People’s Republic of China were not established until 1972, the signing of a five-year trade memorandum in November 1962 had ushered in a period of trade and ‘semi-official’ relations between the two nations. By 1966, Japan’s two-way trade with Communist China had reached the record figure of $620 million (US), but the files show an insight into Japan’s deep concern over the rise and threat of communism in the East. FCO 21/251 questions whether Japan “could help to prevent communist China from dominating the area,” and also confirms contemporary Japanese academic thinking. To enable scholars to study the wider implications of Japan’s role in the Eastern political climate, this section also includes Foreign Office Files relating to Thailand, Indonesia and Malaya.
Japan’s association with Western nations is also documented, most notably with the UK and the US, and also with the Soviet Union. The Foreign Policy of 1967 (FCO 21/251) documents Japan’s necessity of greater co-operation with the US and Canada in particular. Several files from 1967 and 1968 document meetings between Mr Takeo Miki (Japan’s Foreign Minister) and Britain’s Secretary of State where the signing of the trade agreement between Japan and the UK had formed the basis of a valuable political and economic relationship.
The years 1966-1968 witnessed the international increase in nuclear warheads, the escalation of the Vietnam War and the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. These events influenced a radical change on the Western world’s cultural scene with the emergence of flower power, drug use and the general hippy spirit of ‘make love not war’. Seen as a leader on the world economic stage, the traditional history and culture of Japan contrasted dramatically with this era of amity and ‘free-love’. During this period Sir John Pilcher replaced Sir Francis Rundall as Britain’s Ambassador to Japan. FCO 21/246 contains de-briefing notes as Sir Francis retires from political office. He comments on the “strong sense of national consciousness” and the delicate issue of balancing the deep-rooted culture of a nation such as Japan, together with its economic prosperity. To complement this, FCO 21/242 records Sir John’s first impressions and FO 371/187125 gives an interesting insight into the impact of a visit by The Beatles.
The effect of the Vietnam War is discussed in several files. In a meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr Miki in July 1968, file FCO 21/278 reports that the Vietnam conflict had caused political and economic “stagnation throughout Asia and had had a significant affect on the policies of communist China.” Concerning east/west relations, it also states that the hostilities “poisoned the US/Soviet Union relationship.”
In Japan, there seemed to be general disagreement about Vietnam:-
“Mr Miki said that there was not, as in Britain, a bi-partisan approach to foreign policy. There were radical disagreements between the Government and the opposition parties and not merely in regard to Vietnam. The opposition wished to terminate the US/Japan security treaty. The Government were determined to maintain it. The opposition were very anti-American over Vietnam. The Government, while not supporting everything the Americans did there, could see no benefit in public condemnation of US policies. There was, on the contrary, a need to understand what the Americans were trying to do.”
Part 6 also documents the domestic political situation in Japan. The ruling Liberal Democrat Party was seen to be in disarray due to accusations of corruption. Democracy was questioned and the ‘black mist’ needed to be dispersed in order to gain a ‘cleaner government.’ FCO 21/238 also reports Japan’s economic difficulties leading up to 1967; profits fell, small firms suffered bankruptcy and many workers saw their real wages slightly decline. But this was “seen as only a pause in a generally upward movement towards greater prosperity.” During this period, Britain “should not seek to deny her the markets on which her prosperity depends…we can help prevent a relapse into isolation and xenophobia tendencies endemic in Japan by maintaining good political relations.”
Also included in this section are documents that cover all the major events affecting Japan in 1965, 1966 and 1967. They include:-
Political and commercial relations with Eastern and Western nations
Defence and the armed forces
Various Japanese political parties
The Second World War (Claims for losses, compensation for prisoners of war, shipping and relics)
Annual reviews for 1965, 1966 and 1967
The Boeing 707 plane crash and typhoon disaster of 1966
With Part 7 there is again a strong emphasis on economic, trade and financial policy issues as well as on relations with the United States, China, Taiwan, Britain and Europe. The focus on the economic strength of Japan becomes even stronger in the files for the early 1970’s. The material again contains a wealth of information from the British Foreign Office Central Political Files concerning Japan. Drawing on reports, memoranda, despatches, official instructions and regular communications between the Foreign Office and the British Embassy and Consulates in Japan, many of the most pressing issues of the day are discussed and appraised. Subjects covered range in scope from Annual Reports and fortnightly summaries of events in Japan (for each year covered in the series), Japanese political, social and economic issues, to criminal jurisdiction over UN forces in Japan, foreign relations, defence issues, the NATO expert working group in the Far East, education, the environment, living standards, culture, student disturbances and territorial disputes.
Part 7 continues the microfilm series for the years 1969-1971. Economic and financial policy issues are particularly well covered. Other files cover the impressive Osaka Expo, the extension of the Security Treaty with the United States in 1970 and the Agreement of 1969 for the return of Okinawa to Japan, implemented in 1972. Increasingly, the documents begin to show heightened concerns in Britain, America and Europe about the speed of Japan’s advance in foreign trade. There is evidence of anxiety about the growing imbalance of trade, the potential for destabilising consequences for international finance, the exceptional growth in trade with China and Taiwan, even criticism of Japanese reluctance to liberalise import controls and open up her markets to the West. The files towards the end of 1971 address the impact of the devaluation of the dollar against the yen, the confusion in financial markets and in trade, the severe inflation in Japan and difficulties for the Sato administration. Also well covered is the great upsurge of discontent in universities in Japan – the peace movement, campaigning on pollution and environmental issues.
Some of these issues are borne out in Sir John Pilcher’s despatch of 21 October 1969 on “The Quality of Life in Japan” (please see FCO 21/591), a 12 page document, which begins:
“Since the war, as the world knows, economic growth has been the prime object of Japanese policy. There are no signs that this policy will materially change in the near future. But in recent months dissident voices have come increasingly to be heard, arguing that a country’s prosperity cannot be judged by Gross National Product alone, and hinting that the time may soon come – may indeed be already upon us – when more attention should be devoted to social policies which do not have a direct and immediately beneficial effect on Japan’s rate of growth. These voices are not yet strong enough to warrant an actual shift of priorities. But they reflect a concern with the deterioration of the Japanese environment, which is real and potent enough eventually to provide a valuable weapon in the hands of those who seek to defeat the cliques and interest-groups which at present rule the country. The latest textbook to be adopted by the apostles of this belief is, strangely enough, a Government White Paper, that relates to the “National Livelihood”, which was published on 10 August over the imprint of the Economic Planning Agency. Even before its publication this White Paper made the front pages of the national press, when it was rejected in draft by the Cabinet and sent back for the deletion of certain offending phrases; these phrases, in the estimation of the growth-advocates led by the Minister of Finance, appeared to state it as Government policy that resources should be diverted from promising economic growth pure and simple to improving Japan’s international standing in the provision of certain welfare facilities. Nevertheless, even amended, the White Paper remains a useful and penetrating assessment of the present Japanese environment and its defects …”
Sir John Pilcher’s despatch of 21 October 1969 entitled “The Merry Wives of Ginza: Women’s Status in Japan” is also interesting. The summary sheet suggests:
“Today, to all appearances, she has been dramatically emancipated. She has a new nominal status in law and in public life, and her education has been revolutionised … Yet another rider must be entered: was she in fact so suppressed and is she in effect so emancipated? On closer examination, the realities are not so sunny in office and factory, in homes and in personal relationships. The Japanese do not necessarily share Western concepts of ‘love’ and marriage. There exists a curious impersonality towards matters sexual. The world of the geisha is illustrative. Unaccustomed leisure for women derives from present demographic trends. The processes of adaptation create fundamental strains and questionings. These stresses are not unique in Japan but special factors render them exceptionally severe. A certain reaction has set in. Thus this ‘revolution’ is the status of women as individuals is much less absolute than might seem. Irreversibly, her distant prospects are brighter. The personality of the Japanese male should also be the gainer in the long run.”
At the end of this 25 page report he concludes: -
“Looking in conclusion beyond present dishevelments, relationships between Japanese men and women will surely find a new equilibrium in due time. It is hard to imagine that there can now be a deep recession into former perspectives. ‘The fact that Japanese women of today can behave so unreservedly towards me’ said Chie Nakane of Tokyo University in a recent interview’ simply means that it has become possible for them to express their influence openly. It does not mean that weak women have suddenly become strong. It is not a qualitative change but a conditional one. True, but it is a conditional change of immense significance. It is, as I said at the beginning, what much of the fuss of 1969 is really all about. Being unsubjected to arduous infantile disciplines, because she is not considered sufficiently important, the Japanese female is more naturally spontaneous, more flexible, more free-moving than the male. She is, so to speak, quicker on the draw all round – and is increasingly gaining the nerve to demonstrate it …”
The files for 1969 contain much material on the British Week in Tokyo, 26 September to 5 October, attended by Princess Margaret and Lord Snowdon, the President of the Board of Trade, the Lord Mayor of London and HMS Fearless.
In November 1969, Sato, the Japanese Prime Minister had important talks with President Nixon in the United States. These discussions and other high level meetings are well recorded in the British files with relevant comments and minutes from officials.
The Annual Review of Japan for 1969, prepared by D R Ashe, and dated 1 January 1970, (see FCO 21/721) emphasizes the importance of Japan’s relations with the United States:-
“…In general, Japan during the year continued her economic boom with unabated energy, but apart from her success in securing from the United States the return of Okinawa in 1972 remained cautious and hesitant in her foreign affairs. Japan in 1969 was psychologically as well as chronologically on the threshold of the 1970’s. For the Japanese the agreement which Mr Sato obtained from President Nixon in November on the return of Okinawa in 1972 marked the end of the quarter-century which they regard as the ‘post-war era’. As agreement became increasingly certain, Japanese thoughts switched to consideration of the attitudes and policies which the country, with its growing political and economic strength, should adopt in the new era ahead. The success of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party in winning yet again a very comfortable majority at the general election held five days ago means that the problems of this new era will be tackled by a government with a mandate to maintain the alliance with the United States. The first serious test of this mandate will arrive when the Security Treaty comes up for review next summer, but already it is virtually a foregone conclusion that the outcome will be continuation of the Treaty…”
Mr Aichi, the Japanese Foreign Minister, visited London in May 1969 and Emperor Hirohito made a state visit to Britain in 1971. These visits are well covered in the files.
Whilst Japan was well aware of Britain’s diminished status in the post-war world, it was still important to keep good relations with Britain.
British Week was very successful but the Annual Review of 1969 notes: “ … there is a danger of Japan under-estimating us as a purely European country which has yet to get into our own local fast league while our countrymen in Britain fail to spot quickly enough, especially in terms of commercial opportunity, what kind of league Japan is now playing in. British Week in Tokyo last year provided opportunities for reversing the balance which were successfully exploited, but we must make sure that the same will hold good for our participation in Expo 70 in Osaka …”
FCO 21/926 is one of four files on the visit of Emperor Hirohito in 1971:-
"...Within the short space of 17 days, the Imperial Party met President Nixon at Anchorage, paid state visits to Brussels, London and Bonn, unofficial visits to Copenhagen and Amsterdam and private visits to Paris and Geneva …”
"...Public attitude towards the visit was marked by coolness. The routes were only fairly well lined with onlookers but there was no applause …”
"...The relative coolness of public reaction to the visit did not prevent it from being a success. In fact there were only three individual public demonstrators throughout the stay. When one recalls the number of placards outside Claridges Hotel for virtually any distinguished foreign visitor I think we have done very well. It was perhaps a good thing that the Japanese should realise that it will take some time yet to work themselves back into favour …”
The Foreign Office had been very concerned about how well the visit would be received and worried about public reaction and the feelings of war veterans and former prisoners of war who had fought in Burma, Malaysia and the Pacific.
The Annual Review of Japan for 1970 (see FCO 21/877) makes some interesting points about negotiations with both the United States and Britain. There were a number of complicating factors:-
"Trade relations with the United States were soured by the American request that Japan restrict voluntarily her exports of non-cotton textiles to America. This confused Japanese opinion urged by the Americans to liberalise their own market. Relations with Britain were smooth with the balance of trade in our favour, but trade negotiations stagnated, because the Japanese wished first to see how our arrangements with the Common Market went. Meanwhile the Japanese economy boomed and exultation in its achievement found expression in Osaka Expo 70, which marked its coming of age. Foreign participation had a great educative effect on every Japanese.”
The opening piece to the summary in this Annual Review file is entitled “Japan in 1970: ‘Economic Man’ Comes of Age”. It provides an analysis of Japan’s position on the world stage by the end of 1970 – the nation’s economic priorities and philosophy contrasted with the requirements of defence expenditure, international commitments and social and environmental issues:
"Until 1970 economic success has mesmerised the Japanese: this was the vindication they needed after defeat. In 1970 the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine became clear to them. The price for the impending return of Okinawa and the pullout of the American combat forces from Japan, despite the automatic continuation of the Security Treaty with the United States, peacefully achieved, was increased expenditure on self-defence. Memories of militarism, which led to the disaster of 25 years ago, made this distasteful to Japanese opinion. The ebullient Director of the Self-Defence Agency tried to rehabilitate the Services in the public mind, overplaying his hand in the process. Then Mishima’s ritual suicide aroused fears of a return to the Way of the Warrior, until it was seen in its theatrical perspective as an individual protest against the militarism of the age. It has, however, disturbed minds. Pollution and the defence of the ‘quality of life’ came to preoccupy the public. The whole direction taken by ‘economic man’ was called into question. Now the Japanese must step onto the international stage. Knowing their limitations, they started hesitantly by taking part in the Djakarta Conference on Cambodia and wishing to have a seat in the Security Council. They must now tackle the crucial issue of relations with Communist China, which take preference over relations with Russia, hampered anyhow by the issue of the Russian held Northern Islands …”
Throughout the period, as the files in this microfilm edition demonstrate, Japan did everything possible to foster good relations with the United States and Britain. Covering an era which saw an escalation in hostility between East and West it is interesting to see how, whilst other countries were attempting to break away from capitalism, Japan was fostering a burgeoning economy and building political and cultural relations in the aftermath of the Second World War. This certainly continued to be the case in 1969-1971.
Study of these documents will help illuminate not only how Japan came to be one of the dominant global economies, but also how her relations developed with her regional neighbours, trading partners and allies. They will also enable scholars to question the extent to which the Vietnam war threatened Japan’s relations with the US and the UK? Was Japan becoming less reliant on American support? What role did Japan play on the rise of communism in the East?
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