FOREIGN OFFICE FILES FOR THE SOVIET UNION

(Public Record Office Classes FO 371 and FCO 28)

Part 2: Complete Files for 1961-1962

(PRO Class FO 371/159534-159607 & 166201-166276)

Publisher's Note

'We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty.'
President John F Kennedy, 1961

These next three parts continue our new series of Foreign Office Files for the Soviet Union. The first half of the sixties led to a strengthening of the Iron Curtain with events in Berlin in 1961 providing a physical barrier to add to the psychological one that had been in place since the end of the Second World War. Parts 2, 3 and 4 cover all the incidents in 1961-1964 which further added to East-West tensions.

Well documented events and issues include:

• the ongoing Sino-Soviet dispute
• reactions to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, 1961
• the Vienna disarmament discussions, 1961
• the resumption of nuclear testing in 1961
• the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961-1962
• continuing US violations of Soviet airspace
• Khrushchev's proposals for a separate peace treaty with East Germany
• stalemate over Berlin, the renewal of the Berlin Crisis, the Berlin Wall
• reports of alleged KGB involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy
• the Khabarovak incident
• the political and economic situation in the USSR
• US and USSR agreement on a "hot line" from the White House to the Kremlin
• Nuclear test ban treaty signed by US, USSR and Great Britain, 1963
• The removal of Khrushchev in 1964

The following extract, taken from Sir Frank Roberts 16 page Valedictory Despatch on The prospects for the Soviet Union and Soviet policy, 12 November 1962 (FO 371/166208) highlights the importance and special nature of the British position in Moscow:

"...we should do all we can to maintain our not unfavourable position, which is based partly on our historical relations, which have oscillated between the poles of never very severe hostility and less than warm but often effective alliance, with prolonged cooling-off periods in between marked by a strange mixture of suspicion, respect for each other's qualities and considerable curiosity. We maintain this position today because the Russians still regard us as the most moderate, influential and politically successful of the former imperialist and capitalist powers, now in the second rank of world affairs."

Part 2 covers 1961 and 1962, both years dominated by events in Berlin and Cuba. In June 1961 Kennedy and Khrushchev met in Vienna. The Summit was marked by bullying behaviour from the Soviet leader who demanded that the West recognise the sovereign status of East Germany. Kennedy was not to be bullied and refused to give way. The only point on which they agreed was the there should be 'a neutral and independent Laos'. Khrushchev's demands for neutralisation of West Berlin and western recognition of East Germany at Vienna were not met but he continued to make threats and received a firm line from Kennedy who, from 25 July, announced increases in the US armed forces stationed in Germany. Khrushchev's response was completely unexpected: a 'wall' of concrete and barbed wire.

FO 371/159535-7 provides a weekly round up of news and gossip from the British Embassy in Moscow. Newspaper articles, conversations and rumours are all sifted for useful political intelligence. Agriculture, Heavy Industry, the launch of the new party programme in October 1961 and the new Twenty Year Plan all feature in files on the internal political situation, the economic situation, social policy, trade and commerce.

Sir Frank Roberts comments "Internally it is much more difficult for the Communist Party to run an increasingly complex economy and to control an increasingly well-educated population; the simple if brutal methods of control which produced results under Stalin will no longer do. There is now a constant search for new methods and new organisation, whether in industry, commerce, agriculture or government."

His November 1962 summary on Soviet foreign policy (see FO 371/166208) concludes:

"In Western Europe the Berlin question remains as it was, despite the Wall and Mr Khrushchev's huffings and puffings, while delays in the further expansion of the Common Market are entirely independent of Soviet policy. The new complications and embarrassments of Soviet policy in the world have never been more clearly revealed than over the Sino-Indian dispute, which the Russians have been unable to prevent or to bring to an end, just as the limitations upon Soviet strength outside the immediate range of Soviet influence have been shown up by the United States action in regard to Cuba.the Cuban crisis.may in fact mark an important stage in the development of a more responsible Soviet foreign policy. It is already something that peaceful coexistence is now being interpreted by Mr Khrushchev as implying reasonable compromise and mutual concessions. It should be fascinating to see how this for the Russians very new concept works out in practice in the months ahead."

This microfilm collection brings together invaluable documentation relating to a most intense period of Cold War politics. Reports and analyses by British Embassy staff 'on the ground' in Moscow ensure a comprehensive view of both internal machinations and international repercussions. From the crises over Berlin and Cuba to friction over nuclear tests, disarmament, the Sino-Indian dispute and the trial of U-2 pilot Gary Powers, there is much material that is equally critical of both American and Soviet actions.

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