SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE, 1940-1946

Series 1, Special Operations in Western Europe

Part 1: France: The Jedburgh Teams and Operation Overlord, 1944-1945,

Part 2: France: Political and Planning Files, Circuits and Missions, 1940-1947

Part 3: Germany, 1936-1945

Part 4: Holland, 1940-1949

Part 5: Italy, 1941-1948

Extracts from Documents - Part 1

HS 6/477
Jedburgh Team Andrew: Report by Major A H S Coombe Tennant
Team Members: Major A H S Coombe Tennant
Lieutenant E D’Oultrement
Sergeant F Harrison

“1. Mission.

Team was briefed by a representative from E.M.F.F.I. in LONDON before leaving. Our instructions were to contact the head of an inter allied mission operating in the French Ardennes, and to give him any assistance he required. The mission controlled some 120 armed men, and had been in operation since April 1944. We were to drop to a reception committee in the area, who would put us in touch with the mission. The head of the mission was a Lieutenant Colonel in the French Army, known by the code name PRISM. No further information was available, and when we asked for an address of a safe house and a password in case of emergency we were told that this would be unnecessary since we were to be met by a reception committee. Two French officers, Captain JEAN and Lieutenant ROBERT, were to accompany us to take over commands under the Colonel. We were strictly forbidden to cross the Belgian frontier or enter into official relations with any Belgian Resistance group.

2. Narrative.

On August 15th team ANDREW, Captain JEAN, Lieutenant ROBERT, and a party of 9 Belgians from S.A.S. left an Oxfordshire aerodrome for France at 2150 hrs. The S.A.S. party were to operate just over the Belgian frontier, but they were to drop to the same reception committee. The plane also carried the luggage of both parties. Our own kit consisted of three rucksacks for ANDREW, the personal kit of JEAN and ROBERT being carried in leg bags, and a wireless set...”

HS 6/478
Report on Jed Team Andy by Major R A Parkinson (Fife)

“MISSION: Our Mission as given at the briefing was:

1) to assist ELLIPSE in the organisation of HAUTE VIENNE.

2) to maintain ‘coup de main’ parties for the disruption of the four railways converging on LIMOGES.
With regard to 1) I was reasonably happy, but would have appreciated more information on the general policy for our area, this, apparently, was not forthcoming at the time of briefing, yet, 48 hours after our arrival in France, we received a 10 point plan of operation for the area, which was excellent, it gave the policy, under 10 headings, to be followed, leaving the details to be done by us, this was straightforward and was wholeheartedly agreed with by ELLIPSE when we eventually met him and talked it over with him.

THE BRIEFING: I consider (and said at the time) that our brief was much too long and bulky. Too much space was taken up with descriptions and locations of possible targets, most of these were known about, by the Maquis, from whom full details could be obtained, if and when necessary.

ACTION AT AIRPORT: Satisfactory, except for carrying of the pack, which I believe has now been discontinued. I now consider it essential for the jumping team and the aircraft crew, together, to be finally briefed for the drop, this will help to ensure:

1) correct recognition signal to be given by R.C.
2) height of drop.
3) order of despatch. Bodies, containers, packets.

DROPPING: Generally bad - after I had agreed with pilot that we should jump first and maintain the lights for the containers, when No.1. went to jump the hole was blocked by container static lines, had he jumped then I am certain he would not have reached the ground alive, I managed to partially block the hole with one leg and the despatcher caught him by the shoulder and so prevented his exit. We made another circuit and were told it was now O.K., on receipt of the dispatcher's order Cmdt. VERMEULEN and myself jumped, and we both estimate the time of being parachute-borne at not more than 10 seconds before we hit the ground, VERMEULEN receiving a severely injured foot and myself a double compound fracture of the left leg. Sergeant LOOSEMORE who was to jump No.3., told me afterwards that when he attempted to go, the static lines had become disarranged and he nearly went out head first, he was pulled out by the despatcher, the aircraft made another circuit, and he jumped without mishap.

RECEPTION COMMITTEE: Owing to my injury I was not able to watch or help the R.C., but all stores, less two packages, were collected.

CONTACTS: I contacted the chief of the R.C. at the farm I had been carried to - he knew GEORGES CROC (ELLIPSE’S Adjutant) and arranged for him to see us that morning which he did, expressing surprise to find us in INDRE when we were going to work in HAUTE VIENNE. He sent a message to ELLIPSE who visited us 8 days later.

ACTIVITIES: Once I hit the ground I realised that my leg was broken. I was found by two partisans and carried to a farm house and made comfortable on the kitchen table! I was the first of the team to arrive inside, the farm was crowded with workers plus 4 agents who had arrived half an hour before us...”

HS 6/479
Operational Report of Jedburgh Anthony
Capt. Deprez (F); Lt. Starring (A); Sgt. Bradner (A).

“MISSION: To accompany a half troop of Third French Parachute Bn, to contact French Section organizer Ditcher, and 1) provide liaison S.A.S./Resistance groups; 2) S.A.S./London, and 3) take part in action designed to harass enemy movements on roads and railways, in particular Lyons/Nevers; Lyons/Dijon.

BRIEFING & DROPPING: We were briefed the morning of the fourteenth of August. Left for airport at approximately noon of that day. Met the stick of S.A.S. at airport and then went to Keeville airport from which we left England in a Stirling at ten thirty that evening. We were dropped at one thirty in the correct spot and without any accident… After the drop we were taken to a farm at Ameun at which place we met Tiburce and Jacquot.

FIRST CONTACTS: After having met Tiburce and Jacquot we were told that there would be a meeting of the local chiefs the following night. We went to this meeting and met Captain Laurent, commander of the Regiment of Cluny, and his officers. We found that they were quite well armed but needed specialized equipment. It was only at the very end that we received any of this equipment. There were about two thousand men in the area, all with officers and N.C.O.s. They had already cut the railways to be cut in our Zone and were in a position to attack the main road almost every day. That part of our mission seemed to be well taken care of. Two days later it was decided that Captain Deprez was to go to command a battalion at Charolle, that the radio of team Alan was to provide the needs of the S.A.S. along with another radio of theirs all under the orders of Cmdt. Corman (S.A.S.). Our radio was to provide for the needs of the Cluny area and for Tiburce, and Lieutenant Starring was told to assist Tiburce…”

HS 6/486
From pages 3-5 of the Report of Teams Benjamin and Bernard, sent to contact the F.F.I in the MEUSE Dept., and help in training and organising maquis groups for action against the enemy.

On August 23 Colonel Ambusson and Agnelet arrived and discussions took on how best to organise operations. Existing Maquis comprised 900 F.F.I. troops, about 4,000 Sédentaires, 330 F.T.P. troops, as well as an assortment of some 3,000 Russian miners and scattered Poles and Yugoslavs. Six priority parachute drops were planned.

“On the following day, however, most of these plans were completely upset by a sudden and quite unexpected raid by the Gestapo and Milice on the nearby town of LES ISLETTES. Posing as F.F.I. maquis who wished to be put in contact with the local resistance chiefs they succeeded in bringing off a ‘coup de filet’, as a result of which SAULNIER, the operations chief of the MEUSE, his younger brother HENRI, who was one of our couriers, AGNELET, and his assistant, JEANNIN, were all arrested, together with several maquis and sédentaires officers who were on the point of joining the maquis. Vague news of enemy movements had reached our ears earlier in the day, and we led a patrol in the morning to evacuate as many arms as possible from the dump in case the enemy should find and attack it. A skeleton guard was left with instructions that should the enemy arrive in the area in force they were to retire to the neighbouring woods and observe the enemy’s movements without giving away the site of the dump by showing themselves. The dump was sufficiently well camouflaged to pass unnoticed even at a very short distance.

Unfortunately the enemy arrived in the afternoon in force (about 150 lorryborne men led by an SS Captain), straight onto the site of the dump, whose location must have been revealed by one of their captives. The guard in these circumstances opened fire and managed to extricate themselves without loss after having killed the German captain.

By an unfortunate coincidence an FTP patrol from SOUILLY which had arrived on the scene with a few sedentaires in order to be issued with arms in conformity with our previous instructions blundered into the arms of the Germans; in the running fight which ensued they managed to kill 7 Germans for the loss of ten of their own men…

On the 29th, contact was made with an SAS recce party led by Major ROONEY (JoJo 30)… At this stage we heard that American troops were nearing our sector. We received a message from UK instructing us to send a party of guides through the lines to meet them, which we did. They took with them such information on the enemy as we possessed, for which the forward American troops, were, so we learnt later, apparently very grateful.

On the 30th we led three offensive patrols along the STE. MENCHOULD - LES ISLETTES - CLERMONT road with the object of engaging the enemy as he pulled out, and preventing the destruction of the railway tunnel and bridges at STE. MENCHOULD.

The STE. MENCHOULD patrol led by Capt. MARCHAND and Cmdt. DULAC entered the town, killing an SS despatch rider and 3 others, and established contact with the local F.F.I. force, numbering about 80 men led by M. CANONE. Together they had hoped to seize the town, or negotiate its surrender before the entry of the Americans but the local forces were cut off from our patrol as they were trying to join it with the result that our men, who had only numbered 8, were forced to retire under artillery and mortar gun fire from tanks hastily brought up by the German command.

The 2nd patrol meanwhile reached the tunnel about 2 miles away only to find that the German guard had left a few hours previously. An inspection of the tunnel did not reveal any charges or ignition systems except for a very worn length of Bickford safety fuse which had already been cut...”

HS 6/489
Co-operation of Team Bruce with forces of American 4th Armoured Division

“On about the 22nd of August American armoured units were reported at COURTENAY so a decision was made to contact them and find out what the local commander wished the F.F.I. of the area to do. We contacted G.2 and G.3 of the 4th Armoured Division. We turned over to them an American P.38 pilot, Captain John Courtney, who had been shot down and was being repatriated by Roger. He had by this time been provided with civilian clothes and false papers. He was given to the American unit for transport back to his organisation. Conversation with the G.2 and G.3 resulted in their requesting the local F.F.I. to give information and act as local security around their out-post positions. Beyond this they had no idea of their role.

In conformance with the request for information we dispatched numerous liaisons to various towns looking for German concentrations. Ensign Peggy Knight, F.A.N.Y. (Nichole) and Madame Raymond (see Appendix) did some very fine and very hazardous work in connection with this, pushing alone into heavily occupied towns such as MONTARGIS. Large amounts of information were given to the American forces by the F.F.I. of the area...”

HS 6/494
Some final points at the end of the Report of the Chloroform Team

“1. The railway line GRENOBLE - ASPRES - SISTERON was reported cut on 20th June and remained cut, yet on 19th August it was bombed by Allied Air Forces causing casualties to civilians and property, particularly in LUCETTE.

2. After the attack on St. Donat, where Mongolian and Russian troops carried out atrocities, the Germans dropped leaflets to the Maquis telling the French to beware of friendship with Russia, because of the savagery of the Russians, referring the French to their conduct at St. Donat. The debriefing officer, who was near St. Donat at the time of the aforesaid attack, can vouch for these atrocities, and would add that the German officers of those Russian troops took no steps to stop the atrocities.

3. There was no organised liaison between other missions and other Jeds in the field, with consequent duplication of effort.

4. Only 10% of the maquis in Hautes-Alpes were trained by the middle of July.

5. The team felt the lack of a single directing power at Algiers and they felt discontented on this account.”

HS 6/552
Report of Jedburgh Team Quentin
Team Members: Capt. R S Fenton (Br); Capt. J Lassere (Fr); Sgt. D G Rawson (Br).

“MISSION. To be despatched to the areas of enemy resistance in LA ROCHELLE and ST NAZAIRE and to assist the Jed Teams TONY and GEORGE and Mission SHINOILE in their work of organising the harassing and destruction of the enemy forces in these areas.

DESPATCH. As a load of arms and equipment for the French forces engaged in this area was being sent by sea to LES SABLES D’OLONNE, it was decided to include the four Jed Teams SIMON, QUENTIN, RAYMOND and FRANK on the two destroyers detailed for the task…

On Wednesday October 4th, we met Colonel FELIX, who told us that he would like us to take over the newly formed 6th Battalion, with Captain LASSERE as Battalion Commander and I as his assistant and liaison officer with 376th US Regiment, situated on the French right flank. Sergeant Rawson was to be in charge of W/T training - and assist in liaison duties…

In the early hours of Wednesday 11th October the Germans launched a fairly strong attack against our positions with the object of testing the defences and unsettling the men… As one of the company commanders reported that the Germans were nearly into his positions, a French officer and I took down two lorry loads of the reserve company, about 40 in all, together with the Battalion reserve ammunition. At this time ammunition was not plentiful and, in fact, by the time we arrived some of the MG positions had less than 100 rounds left…

Early next morning, Sunday, October 15th, Sergeant Rawson and I with a patrol of eight men went out to blow up the track. Owing to the steepness of the railway embankment, we were unable to reach the track at the spot we had chosen on our reconnaissance of the area. The bank was covered with loose stones which would have made a great deal of noise. Leaving the patrol to give us covering fire, Sergeant Rawson moved towards the German positions to find a spot where we could descend the embankment. We finally chose a spot from where we would certain to hear the Germans if they tried to mend the track again.

Working in pouring rain, we placed the charges in position and when everything was ready, Sergeant Rawson withdrew to take the patrol out of the danger area of flying fragments of rail.

I allowed him five minutes start, and then ignited the fuses. Although we had double means of initiation, all the fuse igniters refused to work, owing to the rain, and I was placed in the embarrassing position of having to strike matches. To further complicate matters the Germans, either having seen the lights or heard the patrol moving back, opened fire with an MG, fortunately very inaccurately. After I had struck about half a dozen matches the fuse finally got going, and I withdrew to cover. Thirty seconds later the charges went off. A reconnaissance next morning showed that all four rails had been cut by the charges...”

HS 6/567
Interrogation of Madame M K de Baissac (Claudine/Jeweller), 30 January 1945

“Informant’s mission was to work as courier to her husband, DAVID (Claude de Baissac), who was organiser of the Scientist Circuit, BORDEAUX. Her husband had gone to France on 30.7.42, and Informant left England in September 1942 for Gibraltar, arriving in France on 31.10.42. …

Informant’s cover story was not tested until much later, when she was interrogated by the Gestapo. Her papers were quite often examined and passed the test every time…

The circuit to which Informant belonged was betrayed to the Germans by a man called GRANDCLEMENT, who worked with DAVID. The casualties were not as numerous as might have been expected, for most of the members of the circuit were able to get away in time.

At the beginning of August 1943, DAVID decided that his second W/T operator DEDE (real name: DEFENCE) should go to PARIS as the circuit had spread and they were in contact with the chef of the O.C.M. of the PARIS region, MARC O’NEILL who required a W/T. Informant went back to BORDEAUX, having arranged that if there were any messages, ALBERT who was O’NEILL’s Lieutenant should take them to BORDEAUX.

DAVID was due to return to England for a report to the Section, and left for PARIS a few days later. At that time, GRANDCLEMENT’s wife had been arrested and DAVID tried in vain to persuade him to come to ENGLAND with him. DAVID left for PARIS, telling Informant to contact him, if there was anything important he should know before returning to England. A message arrived from London, which it was decided DAVID ought to see, and Informant went back to PARIS, to find that DAVID had already left.

On her return to BORDEAUX, CHARLOT/YVES (real name: V C HAYES) told her that trouble was brewing over the GRANDCLEMENT case, and that she had better go to the country for a while, as there was nothing for her to do in BORDEAUX.

GRANDCLEMENT’S office had been visited by the GESTAPO, and they had found in his safe a list of people working in the circuit. Informant therefore went back to the country, near POITIERS, and came back to BORDEAUX occasionally to see how things were getting on. While she was there in October, she received the visit of CHARLES (real name: CORBIN) who told her that YVES had been arrested by the Gestapo.

YVES was engaged to DUBOUE’s daughter (DUBOUE being a member of the Scientist Circuit) and visited her regularly every week. One day, as he and DUBOUE were arriving at the house, they were surrounded by Germans and shots were fired. YVES was wounded in the leg, and DUBOUE may also have been wounded. They arrested the DUBOUE girl and Madame DUBOUE, who had been wounded in the back and was taken to hospital.

BERTRAND, who kept the café where the circuit used to meet frequently, was arrested on the following morning. Informant returned to the country, and did not come back to BORDEAUX, until the beginning of December when she was to have her baby...”

(Madame de Baissac was arrested in Poitiers on 18 February 1944, but released from prison just before Easter. She found that her baby had been taken to the Hotel Dieu where she had been very well looked after).

HS 6/567
From report dated 24 October 1944, by Fl/Lt Brown-Bartrolli, Nom de Guerre: TIBURCE, Circuit: DITCHER

“I came to France in October 1943 with mission to supervise and train the maquis in the Saône et Loire region, to attack from D-day German railway and road traffic from Chalon, Macon, Paray le Monial and also Amberien in the Ain region…

In November the Germans came to occupy every little town, and the danger to our maquis and our mainly unsuccessful parachutage operation was increased: we had a few fights. Jean Louis DELVIME was severely wounded but in spite of them we carried on, derailed two trains and blew up a few electric pylons as practice. Most important work at that time was done by people in towns and villages who fed and clothed the maquis, received and hoarded arms and explosives, or did any of the numerous jobs to be done…

In February the Germans started big raids in Saône et Loire and in Cluny alone arrested 110 men and women. Fortunately we had been warned beforehand and only George MALERE was there to be arrested, but the wives of Jean RENARD, André ARGNET and several others were taken in their place…
D-day arrived with messages for attack on communications and guerrilla warfare. In Saône et Loire we were able to arm about 200 men. From the very first day these men divided in small groups started the attack. The position at the time was that the Germans were at Macon, Chalon, Paray le Monial, Montceau, Le Creusot, but had no garrisons inside the triangle formed by those towns. However, the first month they sent strong columns to keep open their communications…

From the very first days the lines Lezanno - Parcy, Macon - Cluny, Cluny - Chalon and Cluny - Paray were cut and were never used again… We then attacked bridges of which several dozens were destroyed, but most paying of all were stone bridges. Nine of them were destroyed between Villefranche and Tournus, but large quantities of explosives were needed for each bridge (about 1,300 kilos of plastic) and it took us a long time to assemble such great quantities...”

<back