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SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE, 1940-1946

Series 1, Special Operations in Western Europe

Part 1: France: The Jedburgh Teams and Operation Overlord, 1944-1945,

Part 2: France: Political and Planning Files, Circuits and Missions, 1940-1947

Part 3: Germany, 1936-1945

Part 4: Holland, 1940-1949

Part 5: Italy, 1941-1948

Publisher's Note - Part 2

In contrast to the archival material on the Jedburgh Teams and Operation Overlord offered in Part 1 of this project, Part 2 concentrates on documents relating to the Political and Planning Files, Circuits and Missions, in one of the largest operational areas for SOE – occupied France. Covering the years 1940-1947, scholars can study topics that still remain controversial (such as the fate of the PROSPER network [HS 6/393 and HS 6/426]) and consider the post-war ramifications of policies and operations. The documents provide a fascinating insight into the relationships between General de Gaulle, the French Governing bodies, Resistance groups, SOE and the allied governments.

With Charles de Gaulle exiled in London from 1940 onwards, this section also provides a wealth of attitudes on the General’s role and status during the War. Although the majority saw him as the ‘leader’ of the Resistance and Free (Fighting) French, several papers report of problems caused as a consequence of his infamous difficult manner and unpredictable temperament. Particularly relevant to this series is file HS 6/318 which documents the General’s nervousness of ties with the intelligence services best illustrated by the policy drawn up by Her Majesty’s Government in May 1941 “not to use Frenchmen in operations without the expressed permission of de Gaulle.” Document HS 6/309 reflects the significance of this for SOE; it proved to be a security and political nightmare - if all Frenchmen sent into France leaned politically towards de Gaulle, what sort of effect would this have on SOE’s relations with the Vichy Government?

Further documents on this subject can be found in HS 6/308 and HS 6/312. Both record the in-depth relations of SOE with the Gaullist Movement; the latter reporting the alleged lack of direct co-operation between the General and the Executive. It also questions the subsequent knock-on effect of their relations with the Free French:


“As far as SOE is concerned, all attempts to build any form of para-military organisation with Fighting French help and through Fighting French personnel have met with failure. General de Gaulle is not in a position, in SOE’s opinion, to put into action even 50 armed men to attack a given target.”
Again using HS 6/308, academics will be able to study the inter-relationship between de Gaulle and his leaders. As well as looking at the policy towards the French Secret Services, it also includes evidence that French officials saw de Gaulle as important for the War, but did not think “his position would be maintained for very long after the War.”

Scholars can also research de Gaulle’s attempts to concentrate on relations with leaders of French political groups, possibly in the hope of winning over the French masses and securing his status as leader in a post-war French Government. De Gaulle’s relations with the Syndicalism movement, socialist party, Trade Unions, and political representatives of the right-wing parties are also documented, as is his
supposed ‘quid pro quo’ relationship with the Communists.

Thus it appears that the General is chiefly engaged at the present time in a big political effort to demonstrate that he has been accepted as the leader of all Frenchmen in France of whatsoever political leanings.” (HS 6/312, folio 227)

The files also show that the long history of conflict between France and Great Britain had left traces still reflected in the attitudes and sentiments of certain groups. While France seemed unconvinced that Great Britain would support her security after the war, HS 6/311 and HS 6/316 look at the war-time general political situation, especially the suspicion by US and UK officials as to the policy of de Gaulle’s French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL), formed by de Gaulle when he moved his Headquarters to North Africa in August 1943.

The archives reveal how the US was generally held in high esteem by the French people, although “Petain had never understood the maintenance of the US embassy in Vichy,” and rumours abound of America’s role in helping to maintain capitalist and conservative programs and groups in power in France “as a means of facilitating American business interests.” (HS 6/308) Marshal Pétain’s surrender of the Vichy Government to the Germans in November 1942, and the ensuing total occupation of France, also brought about criticism at the lack of “American observers of the revolutionary changes in sentiment and opinion which have occurred.” (HS 6/308)

Part 2 also looks at the re-birth of the French Army, the part played by Jean François Darlan (Ex-head of Vichy Armed Forces) in his new role as high commissioner of French North Africa, and the eventual military leadership of General Henri Giraud after Darlan’s assassination in December 1942. With de Gaulle and Giraud acting as Co-Chairmen of the FCNL, the papers also look at relations within the FCNL itself, the leaders of the Resistance movement, as well as with Giraud and his (predominantly) right-wing followers.

Until Petain’s surrender in 1942, the files confirm that French opinion of the war was very confused. However, by 1943 the number of Frenchmen involved in resistance groups was estimated to be slightly less than one million, with over two million sympathisers. Their role in the liberation of France is recorded in depth in the archives, with awards and commendations included in many papers. Material dated 13 June 1944 in file HS 6/330 includes an appreciation of the potential for French resistance in Eastern, Central and Southern France. Issues such as communist influences, political in-fighting, areas under patriotic control, and warnings that SOE’s “failure to support resistance in the manner outlined (an Allied bomb effort) may have far-reaching political repercussions” are also reported.

The mission and circuit reports show that the differing political tendencies and subsequent policies, proved to be a complicated obstacle to overcome for SOE agents in the field. JOSEPHINE B, ARMADA and HOUSEKEEPER are just three of the sabotage operations included for study. Containing detailed reports on landing grounds, locations and SOE’s activities in liberated areas, scholars can research the success/failure of missions, relations between the organisations involved and effects of action behind enemy lines. Files HS 6/356-375 cover political and military liaisons with the French Forces, Resistance and Maquis.

The CIVETTE mission, mounted by the London Gaullist organisation Bureau Central de Renseignements et Action et Londres (BCRAL), can be looked at in detail in HS 6/368. Documents BERGAMOTTE, VERVEINE and TILLEUL concentrate on important allied missions to Maquis groups, while files such as HS 6/395 (ROSE) and HS 6/404 (CHALDEEN) offer an insight into the setting up, and destruction, of telecommunications. Several missions also concentrated on intelligence gathering; HS 6/408 looks at the FAUCHEUSE mission to collect information on secret arms and HS 6/401, operation BEDLOW, follows on from the COAL/TURTLE missions to obtain details on German aircraft for Air Ministry Intelligence.

File HS 6/416 is an ideal case study in itself. Covering operation OVERCLOUD in January 1942, it details how pistols took precedence over field bandages, the use of limpets and RAF flares in sabotage, the role of invisible ink in the field and the request for more coffee, tea and chocolate to be included in food drops.

The organisational preparation for D-Day and the reluctance of the Allied Forces to allow de Gaulle to take part, can be found in HS 6/336 and 337. Further files contain information that can be used to research the networks of organisations behind the Allied landings. HS 6/319 complements this by looking at the use of political groups for SOE activities between 1941 and 1944, including papers which question whether some French communist groups “may have independent aims for D-Day”.

HS 6/327, 381, 382, 422 and 423 study the breakdown of the CARTE organisation. Originally started as a group of specialists in military, economic and industrial organisations, it operated over almost the whole of France. By 1942 it had attained the semi-official position of technical council, advising and trying to co-ordinate the work of various resistance groups in the Free and Occupied Zones. Due to this, SOE was in collaboration with CARTE from 1941 onwards. The pseudonym ‘CARTE’, was used to cover both the leader of the organisation in the field and the organisation which he founded. During his time in London in 1943, evidence mounted about in-fighting and treachery within the CARTE organisation. He, and his organisation, was now seen as a big security threat and, as the files reveal, became increasingly difficult for SOE to control. Precipitated by the arrest of his wife in France, Carte’s desperation to return led him to double-cross SOE and the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) by collaborating with the Americans, who sent him to North Africa to help with propaganda missions. The papers are an interesting insight into the political and military consequences of relations with such an ‘allied’ organisation.

Other documents include:


- The Political Warfare Executive on the Allied entry into Rome (HS 6/379)
- The BISHOP transmitter enquiry (HS 6/322 323 and 423) and the penetration of codes by the Germans
- Missions to set up liaisons with Prisoner’s of War (HS 6/399)
- Missing personnel and concentration camp lists (HS 6/437 and 438)
- Local awards and payments (HS 6/445-450)
- Details of clandestine French Newspapers ‘Combat’, ‘Liberation Française’ and‘Franc-Tireur’ (HS 6/308)

Due to the sensitive nature of the material, a few files are still retained by the Department under Section 3(4). However, most of the documents covering France have now been released. The material in Part 2 allows academics to study SOE at the height of its powers and assess the consequences of their operations in Occupied France. Did De Gaulle’s lack of co-operation weaken the position of his own staff? Did he put the Allied Forces into a Catch 22 situation by disrupting Allied intelligence relations with Free French, Vichy and Resistance movements? Was the FCNL on equal footing with Allied Governments or were they at their beck-and-call? Did Washington see De Gaulle as an obstacle to US relations with the Vichy Government? Why were some missions more successful than others and to what extent did the Germans penetrate the Allied operations and circuits?

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