FOREIGN OFFICE FILES: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Series Two: Vietnam, 1959-1975
(Public Record Office Classes FO 371 and FCO 15:
South East Asia Department)

Part 3: Cambodia, 1959-1963
(PRO Class FO 371/144344-144386, 152684-152736,
160085-160106, 166664-166696 & 170057-170087)

Compared to her neighbours to the north and east, Laos and Vietnam, Cambodia's post war years were, if not untroubled, then at least somewhat less traumatic. Granted independence in 1953, the former French Protectorate was one of the nations whose future was to be decided at the Geneva Conference which opened in May 1954. Along with Laos, Cambodia embarked on a policy of neutrality in an effort to halt the conflict between communist and non-communist forces that was threatening to tear South East Asia apart. Accordingly, it was agreed that in common with Vietnam and Laos, an International Control Commission would be established in Cambodia in an effort to monitor events and enforce the policy of neutrality. By October 1954, under the auspices of the ICC, the majority of French military forces and their Viet Minh opponents had withdrawn from Cambodian soil and preparations were being made for elections to be held in the following year.

The elections in September 1955 marked a watershed in Cambodian politics. The King, Norodom Sihanouk, abdicated the throne in order to more fully participate in the political arena, founding his own political party, Sangkum Reastr Niyum which handsomely won the vast majority of seats in the National Assembly. Over the course of the next 15 years (and arguably longer than that) Sihanouk and his Sangkum Party would dominate Cambodian politics.

By 1959, Cambodia appeared to be one of the more stable of the South East Asian nations. Sihanouk as Prime Minister carried a genuine popularity amongst the majority of Cambodians, and what dissent there was he easily contained. Even a coup attempt by one of the country's most powerful military governors, Dap Chhoun, backed by anti-Sihanouk forces based in South Vietnam, was quickly crushed, further enhancing the Government's reputation. By the beginning of 1960 Sihanouk's position seemed unassailable, the British Ambassador reporting how the year had shown "clearly what a firm grip Prince Sihanouk has on the country and how indispensable his presence is to it." [FO 371/152684]. However, whilst the British Ambassador could be cautiously optimistic about Cambodia's internal situation and economic prospects, the volatile nature of the region’s geo-political situation and cold war rivalries were already planting the seeds of future troubles.

By embarking on a course of neutralism, Cambodia was treading a tight line. As well as the global power struggle being waged between the forces of communism and capitalism, there were numerous regional suspicions and antagonism which further muddied the water of South East Asian politics.

In particular, Cambodia, in common with Laos, had a long standing suspicion of Vietnamese motives, which prompted Sihanouk to find creative methods of curbing the ambitions of Vietnam to be the dominant regional power. As a result Sihanouk looked to the People's Republic of China to provide a restraining influence, and the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression in 1960. In spite of this intimacy with China, Cambodia still relied on the US to supply the bulk of its civil and military aid requirements. The US, by now herself becoming enmeshed in efforts to secure the independence of South Vietnam, was prepared to overlook this friendship with communist China in order to ensure the survival of a non-communist Cambodia. As with Laos, the Americans had little direct interest in Cambodia beyond denying it to the friends of the Vietnamese communists, for whom Cambodia provided an essential supply route and hiding place. As the British Ambassador succinctly put it "The Americans frankly regard Cambodia as a 'piece of real estate' which is of negative value in so far as they don't want it to fall into communist hands" [FO 371/144345].

This policy of so-called neutrality, in became the hallmark of Sihanouk's policy, as he played one power off against another, constantly trimming his sails to take best advantage of the prevailing political winds. Whilst it is fair to say that he was not entirely unsuccessful in following this policy, it was one that was perhaps doomed to failure in the long run. For as the United States' involvement in the Vietnam conflict steadily increased, their need to deny the NLF its supply routes through Laos and Cambodia correspondingly increased. Initially the US was prepared to overlook Sihanouk's flirtations with the People's Republic and his constant sniping at Washington, but soon a momentum had built up, fuelled by American officials on the ground in Cambodia, that he was unsound and should if possible be replaced. When in 1963, Cambodia severed diplomatic links with Saigon and announced her intention to open an embassy in Hanoi, relations hit an all time low. By the end of the year the Cambodians refused all American aid and requested the withdrawal of all non-consular US officials. To make up the shortfall in foreign aid, Cambodia began increasingly to look to China and the Soviet Union, for civil and military.

The first months of 1964 found Cambodia in an increasingly precarious position. The war in Vietnam showed no signs of slowing, and if anything, was threatening to spill over into neighbouring countries. The generous levels of aid formerly provided by the US had been turned down, but had not been replaced by equivalent Soviet or Chinese donations. And whilst internally, Sihanouk retained a firm grip on the reigns of power, the first signs of serious opposition to his regime were appearing.

In 1959, Sieu Heng, a leading official of the communist Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), had defected to the Government, providing Sihanouk's forces with detailed information on the Parties membership and organisation. Armed with this data the Government was able to effectively destroy the KPRP at its root-and-branch level across the country. Thus, unlike Laos and Vietnam where the communist opposition was well organised and deeply entrenched, Cambodia was relatively free from any such effective communist insurgency. It would take the communists several years to re-build the party structure that Sieu Heng betrayal had brought down. In February 1963 the Cambodian communists, who had restyled their party as the Workers' Party of Kampuchea (WPC) held their second conference. Following the 'disappearance' of their former General-Secretary, the relatively moderate Tou Samouth, a group of hard line pro-Chinese activists took control of the Party. Under the guidance of their newly elected General-Secretary Pol Pot, the decision was taken to begin an armed struggle against the Sihanouk Government. The WPK accordingly moved its centre of operations from Phnom Penh and established a military headquarters in the northern province of Rotanokiri. Over the following years the WPK established close links with North Vietnam and China and began the recruitment and training of a revolutionary guerrilla force that would eventually sweep to power in the spring of 1975.

The interlocking geographical and political nature of the Vietnam War is again highlighted by the third part of this microfilm series. Bringing together all FO 371/ South East Asia Department files for Cambodia for the period 1959-1963, Part 3 provides the British Foreign Office's perspective on events in the Kingdom, the personalities involved and the motives of the various parties who had a stake in the future of Cambodia.

These files include:

- Annual Reviews
- notes on the internal political situation in Cambodia
- files on political relations with China, France, Thailand, Laos, the United States, the Soviet Union, India, Vietnam and other countries
- files on the commercial relations with other nations
- Papers of the International Supervisory Commission in Cambodia
- UN policy in the region
- French views on the region
- reports on new developments; border incidents
- Papers on the London talks
- reports on the status of foreign troops in the area
- notes on Anglo-US discussions

Taken on their own they provide a first hand insight into the history of Cambodia; when studied in conjunction with the other parts of this series they give an unparalleled perspective on the complex and interrelated story of the Vietnam War. Here are a few extracts from some of the documents included in this project.

Annual Review of Events in Cambodia for 1958 by Mr Garnet, British Embassy, Phnom Penh, 22 January 1959 (see FO 371/144344) describes some of the troubles:

"...At this sensitive moment relations with South Vietnam, which had always been smouldering, burst into flame as a result of a frontier incursion by South Vietnamese troops. In order to save a collapsing system of government and to deal with the Vietnamese situation Prince Sihanouk decided to take over the government of the country himself in early July and he remained in office as Prime Minister for the rest of the year. So long as he was in power there was not one breath of criticism from the deputies and, in any case, everyone was too preoccupied with foreign affairs.... The South Vietnamese incursion, later to be known as the Stung Treng incident, was accompanied by the placing of a concrete frontier post some two kilometres inside Cambodian territory. The Cambodians were very much disturbed by this action and started a violent anti-Vietnamese campaign in the course of which they made a rather melodramatic appeal to friendly nations in general, and to the United States in particular, to persuade the Vietnamese to cease their "Expansionist maneouvres"... "

The Annual Report for Cambodia for 1961, (see FO 371/166664) prepared by Mr Murray at the British Embassy, Phnom Penh, and despatched to the Foreign Office on 5 January 1962, provides the following conclusion in the section headed 'Summary':

"...the quarrel with the United States was more or less forgotten by the end of the year, but diplomatic relations with Thailand have still to be restored. Prince Sihanouk remains highly suspicious of their intentions towards Cambodia."

Further illumination comes in Murray's report:

"...The pot has now been gradually allowed to go off the boil. The Americans wisely held their peace (and managed somehow to restrain their press) and by the end of the year their relations with Cambodia were more or less back to normal. With Thailand and South Vietnam, however, there has been a steady stream of petty frontier incidents and alleged violations of air space, together with a constant exchange of abuse and accusations..."

Friction continued the following year. The following extract from the Annual Report for Cambodia, 1962, (see FO 371/170057) prepared by Mr Murray at the British Embassy, Phnom Penh, and despatched to the Foreign Office on 15 January 1963, provides an example of typical "tit for tat" actions:

"...the Thais in March found a new way to irritate the Cambodians by forbidding them to land at Bangkok Airport (the Cambodians promptly retaliated). In June the International Court awarded the disputed frontier temple of Preah Vihear to Cambodia, which provoked a quite disproportionate outburst of national rejoicing..."

This final extract comes from a Confidential Telegram from the Foreign Office to Washington DC, dated 1 February 1963, (see FO 371/170059):

"...London talks with Americans have gone well. Provisional agreement has been reached that we could both accept the draft documents contained in Williams's letter to Ledward of January 22, subject to comparatively minor modifications and the outcome of talks with the French, as a basis for approaches to the Thais and Vietnamese...."