FOREIGN OFFICE FILES: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Series Two: Vietnam, 1959-1975
(Public Record Office Classes FO 371 and FCO 15: South East Asia Department)

Part 5: Vietnam, 1964-1966
(PRO Class FO 371/175464-175545, 180510-180643 and 186279-186419)

Parts 5 and 6 focus on the build up of American forces in Vietnam following the attack on the USS Maddox and the passage by US Congress of the Tonkin Gulf resolution which gave President Johnson extraordinary powers to act in South-East Asia. Weekly reports, intelligence assessments and critical analyses bring together news from Saigon, Hanoi, Haiphong and Dien Bien Phu, offering a British and Commonwealth perspective on US policy, the motives and debates influencing decision making, the scale of the human tragedy, the efforts at mediation and peace talks to end hostilities.

The Vietnam War had wide-reaching implications; it was destined not to confine itself to Vietnamese borders, with the interlocking geographical and political nature of the region ensuring that more nations would become immersed in the increasingly complex conflict. Whilst Britain was not directly involved in Vietnam she had substantial interests throughout South-East Asia and was anxious to monitor the situation closely. The Foreign Office files included in this collection reflect this, documenting the events which led to an intensification of the conflict and the involvement of far greater numbers of American combat troops.

Part 5 provides all the files for 1964-1966. These include material on:
the internal political situation in South Vietnam
the British Advisory Mission
Robert McNamara's visit to Vietnam, March 1964
US policy in Vietnam
US bombing of North Vietnam
McGeorge Bundy's visit to Saigon, February 1965
North Vietnam's use of Laotian territory for supplying the Viet Cong
the internal political situation in North Vietnam
Viet Cong offensives
US military strategy - attrition, search and destroy operations, massive bombing campaigns
Reports on political asylum, prisoners of war, refugees, Red Cross activities and medical aid
UN, US and Commonwealth initiatives on Vietnam
Foreign military assistance to South Vietnam
the economic situation in North and South Vietnam
Peace moves, conferences and negotiations

The British and Commonwealth viewpoint offers scholars different perspectives and insights on the formulation of US policy and strategy, the day to day situation on the ground, the refugee crisis, the impact of the conflict on the whole region, and its bearing on east-west tensions and international politics.

The files offer up lots of material to look at questions such as:
What were the weaknesses of Johnson's concept of a "limited conflict" to stop communist "aggression"?
What were the main reasons for the escalation of the conflict?
How important was the role of McNamara?
What was the response to the huge refugee crisis?
How significant was the impact in America of domestic public opinion?
How damaging was American intervention for the political and social infrastructure of South Vietnam?
What role did China and the Soviet Union play in terms of indirect support, military aid and diplomatic intervention?
Why were various peace initiatives frustrated?

The following extracts give a flavour of the material.

At the start of November 1963, the Diem regime was overthrown by military coup d'tat. Following the death of President Diem and his brother, Mr Ngo dinh Nhu, the Military Revolutionary Council, under the presidency of General Duong van Minh, assumed control and declared martial law. Gordon Etherington-Smith, from the British Embassy, Saigon, reports:
"On assuming power the military leaders declared two principal aims: to defeat Communism and establish democracy in the country. The measures they have taken since have been in keeping with these objectives. Their prime concern has been to eliminate the abuses of the old regime and to prosecute the war against the Viet Cong. It has been made clear that they intend to allow as much political freedom in the country as present circumstances permit.
The question of immediate importance, however, is whether the war can be won under their leadership. For them to succeed in this it is necessary that they should remain united, that they should command the active support of the bulk of the population. My impression is that, for the present at least, the Minh-Don-Kim trio have matters under control. It is also clear that the junta are generally popular. Their liberal outlook and the restoration of many liberties denied under the old regime have seen to this.

The United States Government sympathise with the Vietnamese standpoint and for the rest have made it clear that they fully support the new regime and will give them all aid to win the war. Support by the United Kingdom (whose relations with the new rgime are otherwise excellent) for the Cambodian conference proposal and for policies aimed at the neutralisation of free Indo-China could cause trouble for us with the Vietnamese in the coming year..." (see FO 371/175465).

The summary of the Annual Report for South Vietnam for 1964 emphasizes the difficult situation:
"A year of continued deterioration in all sectors. The prime cause was the failure to develop effective government which was itself the result of the army's inability to rule and the emergence of new popular pressures, some communist-influenced. Viet Cong strength increased considerably, though not as yet decisively. American assistance to Vietnam was impeded by an unsatisfactory relationship with the Vietnamese and lack of co-ordination on the American side. United States-Vietnamese relations became seriously strained at the year's end. The Viet Cong have strengthened their position in most parts of the country. Militarily they are now operating more confidently in larger units and closer to the main towns; and in many rural areas their civil administrative machinery has effectively replaced the no longer existent authority of Saigon." (see FO 371/180511).

On 8 July 1964, the British Embassy in Saigon reported on the implications of the current situation in Vietnam:
"President Diem failed in the vital task of creating a sound political foundation on which to build a stable and durable system of Government. Those who overthrew him faced the same problem: meanwhile, the Viet Cong gained much ground. By January 1964, however, the original Revolutionary Government appeared to be making progress. General Khanh's further coup caused another setback. He failed to establish himself as a popular figure; his Government, into which he unwisely admitted politicians, was not a success and he made serious mistakes in his public utterances. More effective leadership is essential if confidence is to be restored...The Viet Cong threat now makes the solution of the problem of leadership most urgent..." (see FO 371/175470).

M W Ponsonby in his Annual Report on North Vietnam states:
"The North Vietnamese made full use of their massive propaganda machine to exploit the Gulf of Tongking 'incidents' in August and the International Solidarity Conference in November 1964. Internally the rgime continues to tighten its grip; and its authority over the country is probably complete. The past year has seen a steady increase in the military strength and capabilities of both sides, and the published figure of 22,000 Americans, only a very small percentage of whom are actually engaged in the war, is used to full effect by the North Vietnamese propaganda machine..."

The report concludes: "The situation has reached a point where the North believe that they can count on the political, military and psychological factors working in their favour. The South must think in negative terms of containment; the North in the positive terms of its primary objectives - the ejection of the American military presence in Vietnam and the creation of a de facto Government by the National Liberation Front in Saigon."
(see FO 371/180511).

There is an account of a visit made by Mr Etherington-Smith to three villages on the outskirts of Saigon on 26 July 1964:
".The second hamlet, Dan Phu, six miles from the centre of Saigon, was still subject to the attention of a Viet Cong regular platoon whose presence in the area had been known before Hop Tac got under way. Thus, although the first phase of Hop Tac included ridding the area of armed Viet Cong progressively, starting from Saigon and working outwards, here we were with Viet Cong in the vicinity only six miles from the centre. Charles Napier was told by the American district adviser that no regular and regional forces were available to clear the area and it would only be possible to take action by detaching various popular forces platoons allotted for hamlet defence; this would not only involve loss of security for the hamlets in question, but also inevitably give the show away long enough in advance for the Viet Cong to prepare their defences..." (see FO 371/180512).

Another file contains R G K Thompson's record of his visit on 5 May 1964 to Kien Hoa Province, which controls the mouth of the Mekong Delta, and his discussions with Colonel Chau:
"...We were taken straight to the operations room, which is quite the best sector operations room I have seen in the country, with maps on the wall showing all forms of activity, strengths and plans so that the situation in the Province can more or less be summed up at a glance. The radio room is next door and there is an officer on duty throughout the twenty four hours. There were even three beds in the room so that the Province Chief himself could spend the night there if necessary.

The armed Viet Cong strength in the Province is about 5,000 made up of regular regional forces 1,450, three provincial battalions 600, seven district companies 920 and village guerrillas 2,100. In addition to this the Viet Cong have their own hamlet self defence corps, which is estimated to number 13,000, mainly unarmed, but some of them with hand grenades. Chau estimated that their strength had increased by about 50% over the last six months and that their capability had been greatly increased by the infiltration of some particularly good military cadres from the North. Their strategy was now well thought out and their military operations well executed. Quite apart from the mangrove strips along the coast which have always been Viet Cong permanent bases, they control the whole area around Mo Cay up to the Vinh Long boundary and most of the area south of Truc Giang and east of Giong Trom and both banks of the Ba Lai down which Government craft can no longer operate in the face of recoilless rifle fire. All this accounts for about 80% of the population in the Province and particularly those in the coconut areas. The Government still holds all the district towns and, where there are open rice field areas, as in Binh Dai, Ba Tri and Thanh Phu, a few hamlets around them. However, most of the roads are cut and access is by helicopter or special operation only..."

The four page report ends: "In conclusion, and making allowances for Chau's personality, showmanship and good English, he is obviously one of the few Province Chiefs working on the right lines and trying to get things done. The situation is clearly very serious indeed, but on the whole not as discouraging as we had expected. He obviously needs a lot more boats (we discussed waterways control) and General Stilwell has also offered him bicycles for his Civil Guard to increase mobility. As Chau said: 'They still have their use in the nuclear age'. His immediate problem is to hold Mo Cay and, if possible, to consolidate the town and the hamlets immediately around it to such an extent that the battalion can be released for the Pacification Plan in the A1 area. This will go much better and faster if two battalions can be used together. The one battalion now carrying out the Plan might be badly mauled if the Viet Cong can organise a heavy attack on it." (see FO 371/175469).

Other reports on the work of Mr R G K Thompson, Head of the British Advisory Mission in Vietnam (BRIAM), provide valuable evidence. His notes compiled at the end of December 1964 are set down to give useful background material for any new British advisers in Vietnam.

On 2 August 1964 North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the American destroyers USS Maddox and USS C Turner Joy. President Johnson issued the following instructions to the US Navy:
"(a) to continue patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of Vietnam;
(b) to double the force by adding an additional destroyer to the one already on patrol;
(c) to provide a combat air patrol over the destroyers;
(d) to issue orders to the commanders of the combat aircraft and the two destroyers (i) to attack any force which attacks them in international waters; (ii) to attack with the object of not only driving off the force, but of destroying it." (see FO 371/175498)

Folio 68 of the same file comprises a cartoon from the daily 'Lien Minh' of July 29 which shows Ambassador Taylor and General Khanh in a rowing boat, each proposing to row in the opposite direction.

Many files give details on raids, attacks and infiltrations. FO 371/175517 contains reports on four major clashes between the Viet Cong and Government forces:
- July 4: strong night attack on a Special Forces camp at Polei Krong, some seven miles west of Kontum.
- July 6: night attack on Special Forces Camp at Nam Dong, in the hills some 35 miles west of Da Nong, in southern Thua Thien province.
- July 11: strong attack on the post at Vinh Cheo, Chuong Thien province in the south west of the Mekong Delta.
- July 13: Ambush of a motorized column in Binh Long, 45 miles north of Saigon.

R A Burrows at the British Embassy, Saigon comments on 15 July 1964:
"In each case, substantial, well equipped and experienced Viet Cong forces took the initiative, acted according to accurate information and followed plans which accurately estimated the reaction of Government forces. Senior Vietnamese and American officers are most perturbed that these weaknesses should be revealing themselves at this late stage and after so much effort in the training of Government forces. The Polei Krong incident was an unmitigated failure. It should never have been possible for the Viet Cong to surprise a strong armed camp in this way (there appear to have been no outposts or effective patrolling); moreover the treachery within the camp was most disquieting..."
(see FO 371/175517).

Typical of Chinese press comment is the following extract from the People's Daily which reproduced an article by a Red Flag commentator entitled "Drive the United States aggressors out of Vietnam" on 5 May 1965. The argument in the article is developed along the following lines:

"(a) Vietnamese war has become focus of great struggle between people of the world and United States imperialism. Vietnamese resistance to United States aggression is important component of common struggle of world's people and Vietnamese are champions of proletarian internationalism in forefront of struggle.

(b) Situation is excellent (article recounts successes both in South and North Vietnam). War in South Vietnam has entered a new phase, in which tempo of United States aggressors approach to complete defeat is being accelerated. People are invincible and people's war will surely emerge victorious.
(c) What is way out for United States imperialism? Its gangster nature prevents it getting out of Vietnam. (president Johnson's remark that if Vietnam were lost, it would be one down and ninety-nine to go is quoted). Further United States expansion of the war will lead to stronger political opposition from world and United States Allied opinion and fail militarily because
(i) Its troop strength is inadequate;
(ii) Its battle line too long;
(iii) Its rear too far away;
(iv) Morale of troops is low, and
(v) Terrain is unfavourable.

Reckless extension of war will only further expose United States weaknesses. In this dilemma dual tactics of war blackmail and peace talks swindle is vain attempt to coerce Vietnamese people so that United States imperialism can gain by peaceful means what it has failed to gain on the battlefield. But Vietnamese are united and will fight to the end as long as United States aggressors remain..."

The summary of the Annual Review for South Vietnam for 1965 compiled by the British Embassy in Saigon focuses on the American build up:
"The Americans decided to intervene directly and massively in the war, thus averting the collapse of South Vietnam. Hostilities were intensified and the conflict became to an increasing extent a source of international tension. Despite American affirmations of willingness to negotiate, Hanoi and Peking remained intransigent and Communist armed forces in South Vietnam were substantially strengthened. Air strikes against North Vietnam started in February. US ground forces began to arrive in March. Korean, Australian and New Zealand units followed. The Viet Cong have been harassed and hurt but it remains to be seen whether American might and skill can eliminate the Communist regular forces, as the Americans believe. Military escalation has brought a refugee problem."

"The tempo, scale and range of the fighting continued to increase throughout the year. At the end of the year there were some 180,000 American troops in the country. The American strategy was to establish strongholds in or near the coast from which sorties could be made to engage and destroy the enemy. At the same time in-country air strikes were steadily increased (B52s from Guam made their first attack in June)..."

Gordon Etherington-Smith concludes: "Assuming the war continues, the Americans as well as the South Vietnamese must expect a difficult time while the United States military establishment is built up to the level necessary to take on the increased Communist forces. When this has been done, it will still remain to be seen how far the Communist threat can be dealt with by conventional means. However successful future operations may prove to be, the problem of Communist subversion and terrorism, will remain and for this only effective pacification can provide the answer." (see FO 371/186279).

Ponsonby, the HM Consul-General in Hanoi, provides the following view on events in his Annual Review for North Vietnam for 1965:
"...while it may be claimed that the bombing has had a slowing down effect on the North Vietnamese capacity to support the Viet Cong, it is becoming ever-increasingly clear that the basic objective - to stop North Vietnamese infiltration of the South - has not been fulfilled. The outlook for 1966 is most sombre. The North Vietnamese, in my view, have no intention of showing weakness and are prepared to continue the struggle..."
(see FO 371/186279).

There are lots more documents on morale and the attitude to the war in North Vietnam in FO 371/186289. A report from the British Consulate General in Hanoi, dated 23 June 1966, notes: "In Hanoi the semi-disappearance of meat, the shortage of firewood, and the very high prices of chicken and fish typify an economy that is on the downward slope and suggest that the people could in a longer term become dangerously discontent."

Two files (FO 371/186418 and FO 371/186419) cover meetings in the United Nations on the Vietnam conflict. The extract below is taken from a document, dated 31 January 1966, addressed to the UK mission in New York, setting out suggested points to be made in a speech to the UN meeting on Vietnam:
"We suggest you make the following points in your speech:
(a) HMG have always been conscious of their special responsibility (because of their position as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference of 1954) for promoting a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. For over a year they have made repeated efforts to this end.
(b) The obvious method was to reconvene the Geneva Conference, but our repeated proposals for this have met with no response from the Soviet Government. The latest was made during the Foreign Secretary's visit to Moscow last November.
(c) We have always been willing to consider other methods of negotiation and a notable instance was the proposal for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Mission.
(d) We intensified our efforts in the favourable atmosphere we hoped had been created by the recent prolonged pause in American bombing of North Vietnam.
(e) But all our initiatives have foundered on the same obstacle: the constantly reiterated refusal of the North Vietnamese to consider negotiations on any basis other than prior acceptance of their Four Points.
(f) The first of these points is a demand for complete American withdrawal from South Vietnam: ie: unconditional military surrender. The third requires the future of South Vietnam to be settled in accordance with the programme of the National Liberation Front: unconditional political surrender.
(g) Whatever view other members of the Council may take of the rights and wrongs of the conflict in Vietnam, nobody who wanted negotiations (and without negotiations there cannot be peace) could ever have made such obviously unacceptable demands..."
(see FO 371/186418).

Many files provide observations on the internal political situation in South Vietnam. The British Embassy in Saigon reported on 24 February 1966 that:
"There has been a recent spate of speeches by Vietnamese leaders as a follow up to the Honolulu Declaration. On 16 February, addressing two hundred members of the Anti-Fraud Youth Group in Saigon, Ky announced the Government's decision as part of its social revolutionary policy to set up a special tribunal to try dishonest businessmen and corrupt officials. Enjoying the same status as the Military Field Courts, this special tribunal will pronounce sentences ranging from hard labour to a maximum penalty of death..."

"Thieu made an intransigent statement on the South Vietnamese attitude on 'our most important problem of War and Peace'. He soundly condemned the National Liberation Front as an organisation of Communists who were betraying the fatherland. There was no room for Communists in the national political life...South Vietnam was the victim of unprovoked aggression, and peace could only come when the Communist aggressors agreed to put an end to aggression and subversion in all its forms..."
(see FO 371/186281).

Viet Cong strength during 1964 doubled to a total of 170,000 men, most them recruited in the south. About 30,000 were incorporated into fifty hard-core battalions, elite units equipped with new modern weapons and stiffened by northern veterans. They hoped to shatter the Saigon regime and force its leaders to concede to the creation of a neutral state that could eventually come under Communist domination.

By mid 1965 the Americans had eighteen combat battalions in Vietnam. At the end of July, President Johnson approved Westmoreland's request for forty-four additional combat battalions. In October, in the Ia Drang valley the American forces defeated North Vietnamese units in the first major conventional clash of the war.

The President suspended bombing of North Vietnam on December 25 in an attempt to induce the Communists to negotiate. This met with no progress so the bombing campaign resumed on 31 January 1966. Visting Cambodia in September, President de Gaulle of France called for the Americans to withdraw from Vietnam. American and South Vietnamese leaders met in Manila the next month to discuss the situation. By the end of 1966 American troop strength in Vietnam reached nearly 400,000.

Starting in the summer of 1965, as more and more American troops landed, South Vietnam underwent a convulsive transformation. These files give researchers a vast array of material to assess the impact and reasons for the massive American intervention.

Scholars can examine General Westmoreland's strategy. The basic plan was to deploy American troops to protect US air and supply bases along the South Vietnamese coast and around Saigon. At the same time, units would be sent into the central highlands to block any attempt by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to cut across to the sea and slice the country in two. Having gained the initiative, the Americans planned to launch a series of "search and destroy" operations in which the American forces, with their vastly superior mobility and firepower, would relentlessly grind down the enemy. Finally, Westmoreland proposed to "mop up" the remaining Communists to achieve "victory". He counted on two further efforts to help bring success: (a) the intensive bombing of North Vietnam (b) the American program of "pacification" to gain control of South Vietnam's rural population - "winning the hearts and minds" of the people, an approach predicated more on military muscle than on social and economic policy.

To what extent did American strategy succeed? What were its failings?