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SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE, 1940-1946:
SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE DURING WORLD WAR II
Series One: SOE Operations in Western Europe

Part 1: France: The Jedburgh Teams and Operation Overlord, 1944-1945, Circuit and Mission Reports and Interrogations, 1944-1945, and related materials, 1940-1945 (Public Record Office Class HS 6/471-616)

"The mission was interesting, exciting and we were damned lucky. We accepted much more responsibility than was given to us in the briefing. If we did wrong, we are sorry. In our team we had constantly a spirit of co-operation between the three members, and I feel sure that the three of us will be life long friends, faced the same dangers and having done our job to the best of our ability." (HS 6/513)

Since VE Day, the concept of resistance movements and secret government organisations has fascinated all aspects of the media, from simple fictional accounts to glamorous film noir characters. The release of files documenting the machinations of the Special Operations Executive means that, for the first time, scholars are able to see beyond the romantic; witnessing the first-hand accounts of those who risked their lives in order to stop the relentless march of fascism. These files offer the realities of setting up, organising and posting agents into occupied territories, making for some of the most interesting and exciting material that has emerged from archives relating to the Second World War.

Subjects for study range from the interaction between allied forces, the impact of guerrilla warfare in occupied territories, the extent of German penetration and the planning, politics and organisation associated with action behind enemy lines. Series One, SOE operations in Western Europe, covers activities in France, Germany, Holland and Italy, while Series Two concentrates on the Balkans.

Initially founded in March 1939, it wasn’t until mid-1940 that the SOE received a more formal, if loose, seal of approval from Whitehall. Moving from their small offices on 2 Caxton Street, London, to their new headquarters in Baker Street, the formation of SOE gave existing ‘secret’ organisations, such as the SIS (Secret Intelligence Service), a means of physically carrying out campaigns that had predominantly remained on paper. Famously ordered by Winston Churchill to ‘set Europe ablaze’, the SOE became responsible for supporting and stimulating resistance behind enemy lines. Under the initial leadership of the influential socialist politician, Sir Hugh Dalton, the organisation largely overcame its shaky start to form an essential part in operations aimed at helping to halt Hitler’s increasing grip on Europe.

Unlike its sister services who quietly gathered intelligence behind enemy lines, SOE’s task was to cause as much disruption as possible and it quickly gained a reputation as an obscure and unique organisation. As the outfit grew, agents were hired from a diverse range of backgrounds and nationalities; by 1944, approximately 5,000 agents were involved in operations behind enemy lines, with a back-up support of nearly 10,000 staff at home.

Part One offers a wide range of files concerning the Jedburgh Teams and operations in occupied France between 1944 and 1945. Based on an idea by Colin Gubbins (SOE’s executive director from 1943-1945), a total of 93 teams were sent in after D-Day in June 1944 to assist in Operation Overlord – the Allied invasion of German-occupied Europe. With the majority of missions taking place between July and September of that year, each team consisted of two officers and a wireless operator (in principle, one American, one British and one French). Reacting to pressure from America and France for them to become more involved in the war, the Jedburghs were an ideal solution in helping to bring together the allied forces, on both political and military levels, but with Britain remaining as the senior controller.

Files HS 6/471-564 list the activities of the Jedburgh teams in full. The typed reports follow a standard format; the codename for each team, agents despatched (with photographs), type of mission and its objectives. A detailed analysis of drop times, reception committees, liaison with other allied forces, German manoeuvres and the ensuing battles and skirmishes, are all detailed. These are backed-up with relevant maps, plans and correspondence. With SOE headquarters also based in Algiers, some papers include teams dropped into France from Africa (these are titled ‘Massingham’).

The reports, usually written by the commanding officer of the team, reflect the reactions to unknown situations into which the agents were sent. Drop zones were chosen based on maps and intelligence reports; in reality the terrain was often unsuitable. Several documents tell of turbulent flights and bad landings that resulted in loss of ammunition and radio equipment. Consequently, any communication with London ceased until wireless sets were borrowed, repaired or subsequently found. Separate ciphers were not available to SOE until 1942, so relying on existing SIS radio frequencies and codes to contact London, posed problems for agents, as HS 6/511 reveals. In this instance, team GEORGE had not made contact with London for 15 days. Fearing that the Gestapo had caught the agents, GEORGE’s frequencies were constantly monitored, but their communications and requests for arms remained largely ignored. Detailing the operation, the commanding officer concludes:

"This was done by a miracle... these results had been heavily paid for by hundreds of arrestations and murders. We were feeling very depressed, considering what could have been done if we had received the arms and money we were begging for in time. In that case we can guarantee that on the 5th of August 10,000 men could have been armed. Not a single Jerry would have escaped and damage done to the enemy could have been incredible."

Scholars will be able to study the reasons and consequences behind the breakdown in communications with London and Algiers.

The files in Part One will also help to answer any questions regarding the position and status of SOE in the ‘league table’ of secret organisations. Most of the reports cover relations with fellow secret services such as the SAS and/or SIS; SOE’s attitudes and relations with them differ considerably from team to team: -

"Our relations with the SAS were very good; Lt Mylook worked with us, and insisted that London should supply our Maquis with arms, in order to encourage the excellent officers, and young men. The presence of the SAS was a help to all the men of the Maquis, who felt that they were being helped. Owing to the lack of arms, we were unable to do even a small part of what should have been possible, if our requests had been acceded to." (HS 6/482)

"From what we gathered at the briefing we knew before we started that contact with the SAS and liaison with them would be most difficult. On arriving there we found this to be absolutely true. Perhaps contrary to our orders we avoided them as much as possible but as I have stated before liaison with them was affected. Jedburghs and SAS cannot work together. We heard that FREDERICK had the same difficulty. They should be used, in our opinion, strictly as OG groups of fighting men. Their fighting qualities were excellent but as for diplomacy and tact and organisation, Jedburghs are much better." (HS 6/513)

Files HS 6/566-584 cover the circuit and mission reports and interrogations of agents on their return from operations in France. Listed alphabetically using the agent’s real name, the reports provide information concerning their ‘nom de guerre’, circuit and operational name. Details regarding clandestine activities pre and post D-Day, cover stories, recruiting and training of Maquis and Resistance groups, safe houses and enemy counter intelligence can be studied for each circuit. The wider effects of operations can also be researched, such as the effects of sabotage, German infiltration, casualties, arrests and cross/parallel circuits. The following extracts show the fundamental problems and conditions that informants were up against during operations in the field.

"Very few days after D-Day I received from General Koenig an order that we were to become all FFI with one chief the departmental head of the FFI, Captaine de la Forte (FERRANT). I contacted him. A more unhappy choice could never have been made than placing him at the head of Sane et Loire. A nice boy, honest, brave, an ideal 2nd lieutenant, he never was able to command more than a company. Distrusted politically by the average man, envied and distrusted by the political organisations (MUR, FTP), and an ex-admirer of Ptain….." (HS 6/567)

"The second example given [of penetration by the enemy] was that of a young Alsatian, who posed as a deserter from the Waffen S.S. and was recommended and brought to the Maquis by a man who was already well-known in the resistence… it transpired that the Alsatian had, in fact, been sent to the Maquis by the Germans and that he had persuaded the batman to work for him. He confessed that his mission was to signal the whereabouts and report on the strength and morale of this particular Maquis. Both men were tried and shot." (HS 6/572)

The diplomatic problems caused by the differing political tendencies of French organisations are also documented throughout the files. Although agents were instructed to ignore the affiliations of various groups, their reports indicate that the outlook of the French people seemed to be more nationalist, rather than allied. In HS 6/564, Captain J.C. Montague concludes: -

"Civilian and Political affairs may be looked after by a mission of the same nationality as the occupied country. Military affairs are best looked after by a Military mission which is entirely independent of any political mission and is under the orders of the Allied High Command."

‘’We then moved into a camp in the mountains back of St Bertrand des Comminges about 25kms west as we learned that certain elements among the French were selling us out to the Boche… At this time we had more to worry about from the French than we did from the Germans… From this point on we had to be most careful about our security and it was impossible for me to be seen in uniform in the villages… The resistance groups began to doubt our ability to produce anything except promises… At this point, we saw that the whole situation was becoming one of politics with the different groups within the F.F.I. starting to fight among themselves for power, and as the mission given us was a military one we carefully avoided anything to do with politics." (HS 6/490)

Several files also cover relations with American troops and the presence of enemy military forces in occupied France.

"The movement of the American forces seemed to be towards the east and north-east so we decided that the mission of the FFI in the department of the Yonne was to secure the open right flank of the American forces and to push the Germans as far south away from this flank as possible…Close contact was kept with the other resistance units of the department and with the American units in the neighbourhood. Co-operation between the two enabled the Americans to pick up any German troops which they otherwise would not have heard about or been able to tackle." (HS 6/489)

"After the attack on St. Donat, where Mongolian and Russian troops carried out atrocities, the Germans dropped leaflets to the Maquis telling the French to beware of friendships with Russia, because of the savagery of the Russians, referring the French to their conduct at St. Donat. The debriefing officer, who was near St Donat at the time of the aforesaid attack, can vouch for these atrocities, and would add that the German officers to those Russian troops took no steps to stop the atrocities." (HS 6/494)

Part One also offers the opportunity to study:

The actions against Vichy shipping
Relations with French Authorities, Maquis and Free French
The use of Breton fishermen in sea operations
Air transport operations BUICK, CADILLAC and GRASSY involving the USAAF
SAS operations under SHAEF control
Disruption to communications
Contrast in operations between northern and southern regions
The command and control of Resistance after D-Day

The publication of these important archives will enable scholars to debate issues more thoroughly, to assess the success/failure of operations and to study the crucial contribution that SOE made to the Second World War.

"The contribution of the French and Belgian resistance movements to the success of Operation Overlord and the speed with which France and Belgium were liberated is beyond dispute, particularly in disrupting communications and delaying the movements of enemy forces."
J G Beevor,
writing in SOE: Recollections and Reflections, 1940-1945 (London, 1981)

"I consider that the disruption of enemy rail communications, the harassing of German roadworks and the continual and increasing strain placed on the German War Economy and internal services throughout occupied Europe by the organised forces of resistance, played a very considerable part in our complete and final victory."

Eisenhower to Gubbins,

31 May 1945



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