SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE, 1940-1946:
SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE DURING WORLD WAR II
Series Two: SOE Operations in the Balkans

Part 1: Yugoslavia, 1939-1945 (HS 5/868-969)

Introduction

Recent events in the former Yugoslavia have brought much greater attention to this troubled region. The SOE files contain extensive material on the problems of different nationalities, ethnic and political affiliations.

Yugoslavian terrain was particularly suitable for resistance activity and various partisan armies harried the German forces of occupation mercilessly from April 1941 onwards. SOE efforts to support partisan forces in Yugoslavia are documented throughout HS 5/868-969.

Initially SOE support was given to Colonel Draza Mihailvoic who led one of the largest groups of resisters. The SOE mission (MACMIS) determined that support should be switched to Josip Broz, the Croat Labour leader better known as Tito, who was the other major resistance organiser, leading over 10,000 partisans by 1942.

The files are full of local reports compiled by SOE officers, political and strategic assessments, details of operations, propaganda, details of couriers and supply drops. The following topics are well covered:

• Dealings with the exiled Yugoslav government.
• Initial contacts with Mihailovic and the early encouragement of Yugoslav opposition groups, 1941-1942.
• Reorganisation of the Yugoslav section of SOE in 1942.
• The debate between SOE and the Foreign Office on spheres of authority in Yugoslavia.
• The brief to Fitzroy Maclean for the MACMIS mission, August 1943.
• Reports and interrogations on the problems of the HENNA and HYDRA missions.
• Details of the HAVERSTOCK mission, attached to Mihailovic, 1943-1944.
• Papers on resistance groups and partisan forces, especially relations with Mihailovic and Tito, including correspondence on military and political activities.
• The policy debate on switching support from Mihailovic to Tito’s Partisans.
• Partisan operations in 1944.
• Air supplies.
• Planning and Policy Reviews.
• Interrogations of alleged enemy collaborators amongst Mihailovic and Chetnik supporters.

By the spring of 1944 the Allies aimed to attack enemy communications, undertake economic sabotage, and cripple industries and sources of raw materials of importance to the enemy. Researchers can assess how successful the Allies were in this policy and examine the post-war repercussions of SOE activity in the region.

Early Policy

British policy towards Yugoslavia was defined by the British Foreign Secretary in April 1941 two days prior to the Axis invasion of the country.  Essentially, it was based upon assurances given by the Yugoslav President of the Council that the government of Yugoslavia would stand by the Allies until victory had been achieved.  Thereafter, British policy aimed to restore Yugoslav independence, to maintain the unity of Yugoslavia among Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and to sustain this unity or illusion of unity by means of propaganda.  For their part, the Yugoslav government, in exile from April 1941 in Athens, then Jerusalem, and finally in London, accepted these aims, but doubts persisted about its willingness or ability to do so, especially, perhaps, in view of the serious internal nationality problems.  The most burning of these was the issue of the Croats, and the British government tried to get the Yugoslav government to provide a statement disclaiming any intention to create a Serb dominance and an assurance that all Yugoslavs would, on the cessation of war, be treated equally.

The files contain a good deal of material on SOE attempts to establish effective relations with the exiled Yugoslav government, and the names of the key figures in that government appear repeatedly.  To some extent it was successful in this aim, establishing communications via Jovan Djonovic, delegate of the Royal Government of Yugoslavia for propaganda and communications with Yugoslavia.  As regards exiled politicians, many were clearly out for their own ends, and at least one of them, Radovic (code name BROTHER), was rumoured to be collaborating with the Germans.

This was a problematic time for SOE, as by August 1941 it had been unable to find a means by which a courier working from Istanbul might be successfully infiltrated and exfiltrated, and efforts to maintain regular contacts with Yugoslav bands themselves proved to be impossible.  Prior to the enemy occupation of Yugoslavia and the departure of the Yugoslav government, there was widespread subversive activity in the country undertaken by SOE or by its predecessor, Section D of SIS.  Officers were entering the country on a weekly basis with large consignments of explosives both by land and sea, initially building up a strong underground network and, on the enemy occupation of the country, encouraging every form of active opposition.  They also supported the Serb Peasant Party and the Slovene underground organizations.  The arrival of the German Gestapo forced the immediate departure of the SOE officer in Belgrade, but he was replaced in November 1940.  In March 1941 the pro-Axis regime of Prince Paul was overthrown and a month later the Germans invaded.

By August 1941 SOE aimed to organize Partisan forces in order to maintain a certain degree of active resistance to the occupying forces sufficient to cause them real inconvenience.  It was also vital to maintain a widespread underground resistance which might raise a general revolt in the future.  For this purpose it was necessary to re-establish radio communications with the Partisans and any other opposition movements.  In order to maintain the morale of these forces in Yugoslavia, it was recommended that there should be active propaganda including radio broadcasts, distribution of leaflets and oral dissemination through couriers.

Mihailovic and organized resistance

On the enemy occupation of Yugoslavia, Mihailovic, a regular army officer, refused to submit and escaped to the mountains, and it was primarily to his forces that Britain directed her support for several years.  An initial contact with him was formed when a submarine carrying a Yugoslav mission, together with an SOE officer, landed on the Dalmatian Coast with a view to gathering information about internal conditions.  The officer met up with the forces of Tito – who was not then known – and was instructed to break with him and proceed to Mihailovic where the mission remained until February 1944.

General Mihailovic’s support was chiefly military, but he also had followers among the Serb Agrarian Party, industrialists in Belgrade and elements from the former Patriotic Society based in Montenegro.  He was Minister of War in the Yugoslav government and the leader of resistance in Serbia, Montenegro, Hercegovina and the southern part of Bosnia.  Besides him there were two other main groups of organized resistance in Yugoslavia.  The most important was the Partisans (National Liberation Partisan Detachments) under Tito or Josip Broz, the Croat labour leader who had organized communist cells in Yugoslavia from 1937.  By April 1942 there were 10,000 Partisans and this had doubled by April 1943.  The other opposition group was an amorphous body of so-called Independent Chetniks, some of them loosely associated with Mihailovic, but not under his control.

By the autumn of 1941 evidence suggested that British aid was being used by Mihailovic to fight the Partisans.  By April 1942 the two camps were involved in civil war.  Relations with Mihailovic were never particularly easy partly because of his dissatisfaction with the level of supplies dropped to him; partly because of the unsatisfactory nature of Allied propaganda in Yugoslavia; and partly because of constant allegations and counter-allegations about collaboration with the enemy.  In Bosnia the Partisans had allied themselves with the Ustashi, the Croat police who were loyal to the puppet government.  British efforts to bring pressure to bear on the Partisans by means of their contacts with the Soviet government were undermined by allegations from the Partisans that Mihailovic was himself cooperating with General Nedic and with the occupying forces against the Partisans.  By October 1942 it was clear that Mihailovic was abstaining from any action against the enemy which would impair his ability to fight the Partisans.  The British Liaison Officer attached to his headquarters stated that while Mihailovic would undertake action against the Ustashi and the Moslems he would not oppose the Axis until a new Allied front was formed in the Balkans.  However, Britain continued to support him and planned to increase its representation to his headquarters.  On the other hand, as the files reveal, there was from the spring of 1943 an increasing interest in the possibility of diverting support to the Partisans.  The strongest proponents of this were senior SOE figures in Cairo who, with their constant access to detailed information on internal Yugoslav affairs, believed that Mihailovic would never devote his efforts wholeheartedly to the defeat of the enemy and that in fact there was strong evidence that he was collaborating with the enemy.  The files contain a good deal of material on the policy debates of this time and on assessments of the resources and capabilities of both Mihailovic and the Partisans.

In spite of the misgivings about Mihailovic, it was decided to continue supplies to him on certain conditions.  Above all he was to cease cooperation with the Italians and to refrain from fighting the Partisans in Serbian lands except in self-defence.  Further, he was to resist influence of near-collaborationists and vested interests; accept directives of GHQ Middle East directed through the SOE staff attached to his forces, and conform to Allied and United Nations strategy.  The files record in detail the debates between various SOE officers and between SOE and the Foreign Office about the means by which Mihailovic and his followers might best be brought into line. At the front of HS 5/934 is a 21 page report on the history of SOE in Yugoslavia from early 1941 to June 1944, based on the experiences of Lt Col David Thomas Hudson. On page 8 he states: “Mihailovic emerged as more fanatically anti-Croat, anti-Moslem, anti-Catholic and anti-Communist than he was anti-Axis…”

Tito, the Partisans and MACMIS

The decision to switch resources to the Partisan forces as the main element of resistance to the Axis was occasioned by the routing of Mihailovic’s forces by the Partisans in the aftermath of a German offensive.  It was decided to infiltrate a relatively senior officer to Tito’s headquarters, and by September 1943 Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean had arrived there.  In December 1943 the Partisans were publicly recognized as an Allied force by Eden, and their recognition by Churchill in February 1944 meant an increase in supplies.  At the same point it was decided to withdraw the mission to Mihailovic amidst further recriminations and evidence of collaboration with enemy forces.  The change in British strategy occasioned by Maclean’s mission (MACMIS) was of some significance and there is a considerable amount of material on every aspect of it, including preparations, conduct, execution of its functions, and policy papers which analyse in depth the nature of SOE involvement in the country.  HS 5/870 and HS 5/879 include various Briefs and Directives setting out instructions to Maclean. There is also material in the files on other missions to Tito’s headquarters, including the infiltration of Bill Deakin, Bill Stuart and of Basil Davidson earlier in 1943.

For his part, Maclean argued in December 1943 that the Partisans would control Yugoslavia after the war irrespective of Allied intentions and that, in view of continuing support for Mihailovic in some quarters, it was pointless to try to split the Partisan movement.  To the argument that the Partisans were communists and that they would establish a pro-Soviet regime after the war, Maclean failed to see in the Partisan movement any of the objectionable features of communism elsewhere and the movement had, in any case, provided a unity between Serbs, Croats and Slovenes which had not come from any other source.  According to Maclean the future attitude of Yugoslavia depended upon the attitude taken by the Allies during the war and, in his judgement, it would be unwise to alienate the Partisans by supporting Mihailovic and the exiled government.  Furthermore, Maclean felt that it was wrong to regard the king as a unifying force, and he recommended the Allies should abstain from any intervention on his behalf.

Some SOE officers considered it possible to wean Tito from communism and direct his loyalties to the king.  On the other hand, even if the Partisans could contribute substantially to the war effort at a later stage, the prospect remained of Yugoslavia being united after the war but under the influence or control of the Soviet communists.  In view of this possibility it seemed wise to continue some support for Mihailovic, thereby averting a purely communist state, to save at least Old Serbia from communism and restore King Peter there.  The difficulty with this strategy, as the files make clear, was that it had proved impossible to mobilize Mihailovic against the Germans.

Initial plans for MACMIS decreed that Maclean was to be seconded to SOE, that he was to command the SOE mission attached to the GOC commanding the Partisan forces, and that he was in the first instance to report to the Head of SOE Cairo.  The latter in turn would forward Maclean’s reports to the Middle East Defence Committee.  Policy still aimed to support all anti-Axis elements provided they did not attack each other, that collaboration with the Axis stopped, and that this policy accorded with the operational needs of the C-in-C Middle East.  Maclean was also to keep HM Ambassador Yugoslavia or the Minister of State informed of his progress.

The principal aim of MACMIS was overtly political rather than military or connected purely with subversion, and as the files reveal this led to serious disagreements and prolonged debate about the proper lines of authority and the means by which Maclean should report.  The anxieties of SOE were not helped by Maclean’s alleged disdain for SOE and his apparent preference for reporting direct to the Foreign Office.

His mission was, simply stated, to unite and reconcile the Partisans, Mihailovic and other opposition elements so that Yugoslav unity might be preserved.  It was also hoped that the exiled King Peter would return, and he was to be the key figure in any propaganda exercise aimed to create unity.  Maclean was also to gather information on the political aspirations and affiliations of the non-Mihailovic groups, to discover the extent of Tito’s authority in the various parts of Yugoslavia and the opinions held by the various nationalities towards King Peter, Mihailovic and the existing Yugoslav government.  In the early stages of his mission it was important to establish if Mihailovic was obstructing coordination of military activities and the Allies’ aim of uniting Yugoslavia.  Maclean was also to investigate bands who did not follow Mihailovic or the Partisans, and to try and discover the extent of Moscow’s influence.

In terms of military functions Maclean was to train, organize and arrange for the equipment of all resistance movements other than those of Mihailovic and to plan short-term and long-term operations to fit in with Allied invasion plans or for a general rising.  The military activities of these resistance movements were to be coordinated by SOE Cairo on behalf of the C-in-C Middle East (or AFHQ) with those of Mihailovic’s forces.

Debate persisted about whether or not Yugoslavia and Maclean’s mission were legitimate concerns of SOE.  Some senior SOE officers felt that their only interest in Yugoslavia was that it bordered with Austria, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, and was therefore a suitable springboard for operations behind enemy lines in those countries.  However, it was an essential aim of the mission to re-establish forward bases for penetration into those countries, and SOE regarded Maclean’s mission as vital in boosting relations with Tito.  Furthermore, if this was not done, the Russian mission at Tito’s headquarters would capitalize on the situation and assert their ascendancy.

Hudson’s report in HS 5/934 provides the following analysis of events: “No fewer than six major offensives were launched at various times against the Partisans by the combined might of the Axis.  These reached a bloody climax in the Montenegrin campaign of summer 1943, when the main body of Tito’s forces came near to being encircled and wiped out by a force including, besides seven German and four Italian divisions, Bulgarian, Ustasi and Domobran troops together with Mihailovic’s Chetniks, backed by strong artillery and air support.  The attack failed; and the Partisans emerged from the battle stronger and more confident than ever.  The collapse of Italy swung the balance further against Germany. The joint Axis strength fell: the Partisans, with masses of Italian booty, rose to a greater height of power.”

Due to the conditions under which Tito conducted operations in Yugoslavia, early in 1944 it was agreed that he was to be in overall charge of them, and the Allies were to confine themselves to operations connected with the delivery of supplies by sea and air, to Naval operations in the Adriatic and supporting air operations, to the provision of light ground forces for small amphibious operations and to assisting in the defence of key bases.  Debate about Maclean’s status continued well into 1944.  His mission was renamed the Allied Military Mission’ (AMM) and became an official political military mission to Tito’s forces, and was therefore no longer an SOE Field Operational Unit.  While, therefore, SOE was to continue sending supplies to Tito and might still have a small Yugoslav section for clandestine operations and an officer attached to AMM, it would not control the mission itself.  This took account of the fact that the Royal Yugoslav Government had reached an agreement with Tito whereby the former recognized Tito’s position as the head of Internal Affairs in Yugoslavia and would endeavour to support Tito outside the country and with the UN.  Maclean, as the representative of the Prime Minister and Supreme Allied Commander with Tito, was to provide liaison between Tito and SAC, the OC Balkan Air Force and all other British military or civil authorities.  He was also to make recommendations to the AOC Balkan Air Force after consultation with Tito for Allied support of all kinds to the Partisans.

The files also contain detailed information on the nature of general strategic and military objectives in Yugoslavia, including specific attacks on enemy communications, sabotage and operations directed against industries and sources of raw materials of importance to the Germans.  The most immediate tasks in the spring of 1944 were to build up the Partisans by dropping further supplies, the establishment of a mission to cover lines of communications, and attacking vital enemy lines of communications. These efforts successfully pinned down numerous German units which otherwise could have been deployed elsewhere.

By mid 1944 a British policy directive stated that: “every encouragement will be given to the Partisans to build up their forces in Serbia... to do all possible to build up Partisan forces behind the line of the Sava so that, in the event of a German withdrawal behind that line, the Partisans will be in a position to carry out extensive guerrilla activity in the rear of the enemy….” Maclean now commanded twenty-nine separate missions to Tito. By this time Allied commitments to Tito had outstripped the resources of SOE.  This was finally acknowledged on 15 June 1944 when SOE’s commitments in Yugoslavia were formally transferred to AFHQ, Middle East.